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ABSTRACT 
 
THE PROBLEM OF MORAL STATEMENTS IN HISTORICAL WRITING 
by Alexandra Katherine Perry 
 
Bernard Williams (1985) begins his skeptical look at the history of ethical theory 
with a reminder of where it began, with Socrates’ question, "how should one live?"  (pg. 
1).  This question is relevant to historians, who ask a similar question, “how did people 
live?”  in their own work, To wonder “how one should live” or to make statements about 
the ways in which people have lived is to rely on the work of historians.  The question of 
what historians can know about the past, however, is a very philosophical question, and it 
is dependent on our views about such things as what problem, if any, temporal distance 
poses to our ability to arriving at such knowledge.   
In discussing whether temporal distance can be overcome in order to understand 
the actions and events of the past from the perspective of those who lived in it, 
philosophers have offered a wide range of arguments and have come to various 
conclusions. Skeptics, such as Williams (1985), have claimed that distance establishes a 
relativism, which, in a way, prevents us from looking to the distant past and asking 
whether that is “how one should live”, or whether a particular historical practice 
constituted "living well."  In contrast, R.G. Collingwood takes a much less skeptical 
stance, arguing that he believes it is not only possible, but also necessary, to hold the 
beliefs of distant agents in order to do genuine history.  Collingwood goes so far as to 
claim that in order to avoid “scissors and paste” history, or history that makes use of 
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inductive generalization, historians must re-enact thoughts in their own minds that are 
identical to the historical agent or agents that they are studying.   
Questions about whether it is possible for historians to really know the past and 
the ways in which people lived, or whether it is possible for two agents under very 
different contexts to hold identical beliefs, leaves historians in a very precarious place 
when deciding how to present material to students of history through textbooks or in 
classroom debates. It seems intuitive to make these statements because, after all, if we 
aim to address the question of “how one should live” then the work of historians may just 
be our greatest source of what Mill (1869, pg. 52) called “experiments in living” or 
narratives about different ways that humans have lived.  It’s likely, however, that most 
people do not take up either the skeptical end of the spectrum held by Williams or the re-
enactivist end of it held by Collingwood.   
An epistemological pluralism, which supposes that there are "many 'knowledges' 
(systems of knowledge or ways of knowing)" (Eldridge, 2007, p. 1) might be the most 
useful for these historians because it emphasizes that for different types of ethical 
statements and different uses of history, different "systems of knowledge or ways of 
knowing" and beliefs about the possibility of belief might be valid and useful.  Historians 
ought to acknowledge that the types of ethical claims they are making are varied and may 
place different levels of burden on the historian to address the sort of skepticism raised by 
Williams.  This acknowledgement would allow for the examination of various types and 
levels of ethical claims without a strict commitment to either skepticism or re-enactment. 
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In this dissertation, I explore this problem and also survey history textbooks that 
were published over the past seven decades to determine what types of moral statements 
are being made in them.  I find that there are six types of claims that are commonly being 
made, and that they fit rather easily in to two categories.  I explain these categories and 
types of claims, and also discuss the relevance of views toward knowledge to them.  
Because there is not much, if any, distinction made in the texts between the various types 
of claims that are made, I also suggest ways that historians might highlight these 
differences, paying attention, when appropriate, to Williams-style skepticism, in their 
writing and in their classrooms.  
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CHAPTER ONE: SOME CASES IN ETHICS & HISTORY 
 
Introduction 
 
 In 2011 Japan was struck by a tsunami that left close to 26,000 people dead or 
missing.  The epicenter of the Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami was close to Sendai, a port 
city and the capital of Miyagi Prefecture.  News of the tsunami quickly spread and within 
days the world’s attention was focused on Japan.  The tsunami raised questions about the 
stability of the weakened Asian stock markets, Japan’s ability to bounce back from such 
catastrophe, and the danger of the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant.  It also raised 
questions about history, morality, and teaching.   
 Personal blogs and popular social networking outlets were flooded with 
comments such as, “Dear Japan, it's not nice to be snuck up on by something you can't do 
anything about, is it? Sincerely, Pearl Harbor” and “If you want to feel better about this 
earthquake in Japan, google ‘Pearl Harbor death toll” or "if this Earthquake is Japan's 
Karmic punishment for Pearl Harbor, I dread to see what ours will be for Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki”  (Asakawa, 2011, pg. 1).  Quickly, media coverage on the Japanese disaster 
broadened to include debates about free speech. 
 Meanwhile, educators and policy makers have been engaged in debates over the 
content of textbooks used to teach U.S. history.  In Texas, professionals raised questions 
over whether textbooks should have a socially-conservative bias, and later were criticized 
for “sugar-coating” the version of Islam that students were presented with (McKinley, 
2010 and Huus 2010).  A similar debate occurred when Arizona lawmakers proposed that 
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schools lose funding if they continued to include ethnic studies in their history curriculum 
(Lewin, 2010).
1
  
 At first glance, these situations seem unrelated:  What have comments about the 
Tōhoku tsunami to do with debates over U.S. history curriculum?  As I hope to show, 
very much indeed. I argue that textbooks are the primary source of knowledge about 
history and historical events. The emphasis that is given to various historical events and 
actions, the way that morality and moral statements function in history, and the way that 
these elements of history change and are reflected over time construct the way that we 
make sense of history and the way that we understand the world. 
 This dissertation focuses on one particular element of this issue:  the use of moral 
statements in historical writing. That is, how authors reflect the trends of their own times 
as well as their own views about the moral objectionability or justification of historical 
events and actions in their writing, and also how historical writing deals with material 
that is up for debate with respect to morality.  This dissertation sets this problem against 
the backdrop of contemporary debates over textbooks and the content of U.S. History 
courses to explore the meanings that moral statements carry for the use of historical 
writing and history texts in education.  I argue that in light of an understanding of the way 
that moral statements are used in historical writing and of the way morality is reflected in 
historical writing changes over time, a pedagogical approach that assigns a central role to 
pluralism is necessary for critical history education. 
                                                 
1
 This proposal was particularly controversial because Arizona school districts have a large 
percentage of Mexican-American students, and many took the proposal as a direct attempt to 
marginalize these students or to keep them from learning about Mexican culture and history. 
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 History textbooks are used almost universally in history courses as a reliable 
source of knowledge about historical events and time periods.  The content of textbooks 
and historical writing accounts for much of the information that we know about the past.     
Yet, the material included in historical writing and the way that this material is covered 
changes over time and differs across sources.  Lorenz (1996) notes, “Although historians 
usually claim to describe the past ‘as it really was, ‘the variety of their descriptions and 
their changes over time is one of the most outstanding features of historiography” (p. 
234).  This accounts for the debates over textbooks and history curriculum currently 
being covered in the media, which are fueled on by disagreements over how best to 
present material and which content should be included or excluded. 
  These debates over history also have implications that reach far past the 
classroom.  Indeed, it is common to hear talk of history repeating itself, historical cycles, 
and learning from the past in everyday conversations.  Howard Zinn (2003) notes: 
 What we choose to emphasize in this complex history will determine our lives. If 
 we see only the worst, it destroys our capacity to do something. If we remember 
 those times and places--and there are so many--where people have behaved 
 magnificently, this gives us the energy to act, and at least the possibility of 
 sending this spinning top of a world in a different direction. And if we do act, in 
 however small a way, we don't have to wait for some grand utopian future. The 
 future is an infinite succession of presents, and to live now as we think human 
 beings should live, in defiance of all that is bad around us, is itself a marvelous 
 victory.  (2004, p. 2) 
In this way, the comments relating the Tōhoku tsunami to the attacks on Pearl Harbor, 
Hiroshima, and Nagasaki are very much connected to the discussion over history 
textbooks, what they ought to include, and how events should be presented.  
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 It is hard to imagine those who made comments suggesting that the tsunami was 
“payback” for the attack on Pearl Harbor assisting in the relief effort in Japan.  Zinn 
might argue that their “capacity to do something” has been “destroyed” by their choice to 
“see only the worst.”  The problem runs much deeper than this, however.  Individuals 
draw upon the knowledge that they have about history in order to make statements about 
historical events. Would the comments made in the wake of the tsunami have been 
different if the individuals who made them had learned about history from sources that 
had, for example, contrasted the death toll of both Pearl Harbor and the atomic bombs?  It 
is impossible to answer such questions, although it is likely that the historical knowledge 
drawn upon in the post-Tsunami comments is a reflection of the way that historical 
events were presented in history courses using history textbooks.   The relationship 
between morality and historical writing has implications far beyond how students 
understand the material while they are enrolled in history courses.  Indeed, these 
implications extend to the way we make sense of current events and how compelled we 
might feel to act. 
 In this dissertation I explore the relationship between morality and historical 
writing.  My goal is to understand the kinds of moral statements that are used in history 
textbooks and to understand the way that moral statements operate in historical writing.  I 
approach this goal by looking at the moral statements that are included in sections of U.S. 
History textbooks that cover the Japanese-American internment and the use of nuclear 
weapons in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  I look at the differences between the coverage of 
these two events and also look at the way that the coverage of both events in historical 
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writing has changed over time by analyzing the use of moral statements in history 
textbooks across four different eras.   
 Three elements of this problem are critical to address at the outset:  The first: 
What is the relationship between  morality and historical writing?  In addressing this 
question I will discuss the possibility of making moral judgments about the past, the 
kinds of ethical issues faced by historians in writing history, and the kind of 
epistemological issues that arise in historiography.  Second,  I aim to explore the kinds of 
moral statements that are made in historical writing.  I use the term “statements” here 
broadly to indicate both moral judgments and those phrases included in historical writing 
that center on morality without necessarily passing judgment.  Finally, I will consider 
what implications understanding the function of moral statements in historical writing 
might bring to bear on history pedagogy.   
Overview of Dissertation Methods 
 History textbooks provide a wealth of information about the content of history 
courses.  The role of textbooks in history classrooms is likely more central than the role 
of any other source of historical knowledge.  Research on textbooks thus proves to be 
important in understanding the function and implications of historical knowledge.  Many 
methodological approaches to analyzing writing are used for the media, literature, and so 
on.  However, these approaches don’t always stretch to fit textbooks, which are written 
and used in different ways than other kinds of text material.   So what methods ought to 
be used to study textbooks? 
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 Nicholls (2003, 2006) has outlined research methods that are well-suited to 
studying history textbooks.  Nicholls writes: 
  Textbook research is underpinned by a series of closely connected philosophical 
 assumptions. First, on the level of epistemology, there is the question of 
 knowledge. Competing definitions over what constitutes, for example, ‘history’ or 
 ‘geography’, are necessarily grounded in epistemological claims over what 
 constitutes knowledge and about what it is possible to know.... what is considered 
 to constitute historical knowledge is also a question of power or ‘the politics of 
 knowledge’ (Nicholls, 2006, p. 24).   
 
Nicholls goes on to explain how these philosophical assumptions shape the methods that 
ought to be used in researching textbooks.  Ultimately he concludes that a method that 
critically engages the researcher in the analysis of texts by considering multiple 
perspectives is necessary.  Nicholls refines the UNESCO Guidebook on Textbook 
Research and Textbook Revision (1974) in his proposed methods and outlines the process 
of defining a textbook sample, qualitative methods of textbook research that include 
hermeneutic analysis, linguistic analysis, cross-cultural analysis, discourse analysis, and 
contingency analysis.  He also describes the methods of textbook research used in this 
dissertation:  disciplinary or historiographical analysis, critical analysis, and structural 
analysis.   
 In chapter three I give a detailed account of my methods for researching textbooks 
in this dissertation.  I follow Nicholls’s proposed methods for textbook research in order 
to analyze the role of moral statements in historical writing.  In the following section I 
give an overview of the organization of this dissertation. 
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Organization of Dissertation 
 In the remaining sections of chapter one I offer a brief background to the 
historical events that I use in my study of historical writing.  First, I discuss the 
Manhattan Project and the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  Then I discuss the 
Japanese-American internment.  These events were selected because they show both the 
domestic and foreign elements of the relationship between the U.S. and Japan during 
World War II. 
 Chapter two introduces the problem of moral statements in historical writing.  I 
explore the kinds of research questions that are taken up in the philosophy of history and 
describe the two branches of philosophy that are most relevant to history:  epistemology 
and ethics and explain the most influential theories of each.  
 In chapter three I describe my research methods and provide some context for my 
study.  I introduce two broad categories of moral statements, provide details about the 
textbooks I selected for my study, and include a rationale for comparing data across time 
periods.  I also describe the methods involved in textbook research. 
 Chapter four introduces the theory of moral judgments that arose from my 
analysis of the moral statements in U.S. history texts.  I offer in-depth accounts of the two 
general categories of moral statements, backward and forward-looking, and then describe 
the sub-categories that each contains by using examples from history texts. 
 Finally, chapter five specifically takes up the implications that a theory of moral 
statements in historical writing brings to bear on education.  I discuss pluralism, which I 
argue ought to be a central feature of history education, and propose that negotiation 
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between competing perspectives is advantageous to education because it resembles 
professional historiography.  In each of these chapters I will use the two historical events- 
the atomic bombs used over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the Japanese-American 
internment- in order to illustrate points that I make about morality and history.  In the 
following section I introduce each of these events.   
Ethics & History: U.S. and Japanese Military Interaction During World War II 
 
 Einstein’s one mistake:  the bombings of Japanese cities 
 
 When Albert Einstein, then a fellow at Princeton’s Institute for Advanced Study, 
heard the news of the bombing of Hiroshima, the first use of nuclear weapons in history, 
he lowered his head in to his hands and declared, “Woe is me.  I could burn my fingers 
that I wrote that first letter!”  (Herweck, 2009, pg. 26).  Six years earlier, Einstein had 
written to President F.D. Roosevelt advising him that a group of scientists led by Leo 
Szilard, had been conducting research on uranium and that this research had the potential 
to yield results that might be useful to the administration.  Einstein wrote: 
 [I]t may become possible to set up a nuclear chain reaction in a large mass of 
 uranium, by which vast amounts of power and large quantities of new radium like 
 elements would be generated. Now it appears almost certain that this could be 
 achieved in the immediate future.  This new phenomenon would also lead to the 
 construction of bombs, and it is conceivable -- though much less certain -- that 
 extremely powerful bombs of a new type may thus be constructed. A single bomb 
 of this type, carried by boat and exploded in a port, might very well destroy the 
 whole port together with some of the surrounding territory. However, such bombs 
 might very well prove to be too heavy for transportation by air...In view of this 
 situation you may think it desirable to have some permanent contact maintained 
 between the Administration and the group of physicists working on chain 
 reactions in America.  
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 Einstein, who considered himself a pacifist, had a clear justification for warning 
President Roosevelt:  if the Germans were developing nuclear technology then the United 
States had better be able to beat them (Seelig, 1995).  Einstein maintained that he was a 
pacifist and remained wary of the development of nuclear technology, repeatedly 
claiming that his support of the Manhattan Project was only insofar as the project was a 
necessary evil in light of German threats.  Later, he would condemn the use of the atomic 
bombs and claimed that had he “known that the Germans would not succeed in 
developing an atomic bomb” he “would have done nothing” (Clark, 2001, pg. 752).   In 
1954, less than a year before his death, Einstein said to fellow scientist Linus Pauling: “I 
made one great mistake in my life... when I signed the letter to President Roosevelt 
recommending that atom bombs be made; but there was some justification - the danger 
that the Germans would make them" (Clark, pg. 752). 
 The question of whether the development of the atomic bombs was justified given 
enemy threats has been debated widely, as has the morality of using the bombs.  The 
bombings of Japan began on April 18th 1942, 690 miles off the coast of Japan when the 
U.S.S. Hornet launched sixteen military planes to raid Tokyo.  This raid, now known as 
the Doolittle Raid, was the first large-scale strike against the Japanese Home Islands 
during World War II.  Little damage was done to Tokyo during this raid, but the Doolittle 
Raid did much to boost morale among American soldiers and the American public.  In 
February and March 1945, however, U.S. attacks on Tokyo did much more damage, with 
multiple bombings causing over 100,000 deaths in Japan, and destroying more than half 
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of the city.  Still, these attacks are both considered minor compared to the damage done 
by the atomic bombs later in the war. 
 While the Doolittle Raid is considered to be the first significant strike against 
Japan, the U.S. had been planning more attacks for some time.  In June 1941, President 
Roosevelt had signed Executive Order 8807, creating the Office of Scientific Research 
and Development (OSRD).  The OSRD focused much of its efforts on methods of isotope 
separation, in order to separate various forms of uranium.  Many scientists from Ivy 
League universities, such as Robert Oppenheimer, conducted work on this project with 
the majority coming from Columbia University.  The Manhattan Project was worked on 
in extreme secrecy.  In July 1945, the group tested the first atomic bomb in Alamogordo, 
New Mexico. 
In August 1945, the U.S. dropped Atomic bombs, developed under The 
Manhattan Project, and destroyed two Japanese cities, Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  The first 
bomb, nicknamed “Little Boy,” was dropped over Hiroshima from Enola Gay, a B-29 
bomber, on August 6
th
, 1945.  On August 9
th, 1945, the second bomb, “Fat Man,” was 
dropped from Bockscar, another B-29 bomber, over the Japanese city Nagasaki.  
These bombings caused over 200,000 casualties combined in Japan, which was 
close to surrender by this point. Sixty-nine percent of Hiroshima was destroyed, and 
forty-four percent of Nagasaki.  The ethical justification of the bombing of Tokyo, 
Hiroshima, and Nagasaki has been widely debated by scholars, some of whom argue that 
the bombings were unnecessary to cause surrender, and simply a way to show the world 
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the strengths of U.S. military strategy and development.  Still, other scholars argue that 
the success of these attacks prevented further attacks and countless casualties.   
While the military waged war against Japan in the pacific, civilians were growing 
increasingly uneasy about Japanese and Japanese-Americans populations living in and 
around the west coast.  Eventually President Roosevelt would sign Executive Order 9066, 
which would allow the secretary of war to designate geographic regions as “military 
areas” and would allow for the quarantine and relocation of “any and all persons” from 
these areas.  The result was that individuals of Japanese ancestry were removed in great 
numbers from the west coast and relocated to remote areas of Arkansas, Wyoming, 
Colorado, Arizona, Utah, California, and Idaho designated by the military as “internment 
camps” (Exec. Order No. 9066, 3 C.F.R. 1942). 
Resident Aliens:  The Relocation of Japanese-American Citizens 
 Quarantine was something of a theme during F.D. Roosevelt’s presidency.  In 
October 1937, Roosevelt gave what is now known as his “quarantine speech” to crowds 
in Chicago.  The nation was growing anxious of the tension in Europe and Asia, and 
Roosevelt aimed to insure that such tension would not affect the United States.  
Roosevelt commented on this tension by drawing an analogy to a public health crisis, and 
claimed that the United States would continue to quarantine itself off from this 
aggression.  The following is a snippet from his speech: 
 It seems to be unfortunately true that the epidemic of world lawlessness is 
 spreading.  And mark this well: When an epidemic of physical disease starts to 
 spread, the community approves and joins in a quarantine of the patients in order 
 to protect the health of the community against the spread of the disease.  War is a 
 contagion, whether it be declared or undeclared. It can engulf states and peoples 
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 remote from the original scene of hostilities. We are determined to keep out of 
 war, yet we cannot insure ourselves against the disastrous effects of war and the 
 dangers of involvement. We are adopting such measures as will minimize our risk 
 of involvement, but we cannot have complete protection in a world of disorder in 
 which confidence and security have broken down. (Roosevelt, 1937) 
 
 This tension eventually reached the United States, which later became involved in 
World War II.  One of the greatest sources of conflict for the United States was Japan.  In 
December 1942, Japan launched an attack on a U.S. naval base in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, 
marking the official start of U.S. participation in the war.  U.S. unease about Japan 
continued to grow as the level of conflict rose.  This was especially true on the west 
coast, where the Japanese-American population was much greater than in the east.  Many 
citizens became wary that Issei (Japanese immigrants), Nisei (the children of Japanese 
immigrants) and Sansei (second generation Japanese-Americans) living on or near the 
west coast might be serving as spies for Japan.  Racial tension was at an all-time high. 
 On February 19
th
, 1942, Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066.  The order 
essentially allowed for the internment of Japanese-American residents, including U.S. 
citizens, living on the West Coast (Hutchinson, 2002).    The order allowed for the 
designation of “exclusion zones” from which government officials could exclude any and 
all persons, with the exception of those living in internment camps.  Japanese-Americans 
were transported to assembly centers, relocation facilities, and, in cases where criminal 
behavior was suspected, official internment camps.  Overall, 110,000 Japanese-
Americans were detained in eight different camps.  These citizens were given the 
opportunity to voluntarily relocate outside of the exclusion area, but were not offered any 
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help in doing so.  Those remaining within the exclusion area were subject to a nightly 
curfew before being relocated.   
 When the relocation camps were finally constructed, Japanese families were often 
moved into them very quickly, without being told where they would be moving.  They 
were not able to bring many possessions with them, so many left behind jobs and 
property when they were forced to move.  They arrived at the facilities often unprepared 
for the weather conditions of the location, and were forced to share barracks with one 
another, and often shared bathroom facilities as well.  They were offered little in the way 
of education for the children they brought with them, and had few opportunities for 
meaningful work inside the camp.  In some instances, detainees were even shot for 
leaving the prison gates (Daniels, 1986). Some of the Japanese in the camps were asked 
to denounce Japan and swear allegiance to the United States, causing them to dishonor 
their own communities and heritage. 
 In December 1945, the internment camps were officially closed and detainees 
were offered twenty-five dollars in order to reestablish their lives outside of the camps.  
They were allowed to return home, though many had, by this time, lost their homes and 
their livelihoods.  The U.S. public was unaware of the relocation for most of the war, and 
the government justified its actions by citing the need to quarantine potential dangers.   
 Eventually, the government recommended that apologies be made to individuals 
who were interned as well as their descendants, claiming that the “internment of the 
individuals of Japanese ancestry was caused by racial prejudice, war hysteria, and a 
failure of political leadership” (S. 1009, 1987, pg. 4).  
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Limitations 
 There are some limitations to this study that ought to be recognized in 
consideration of any future research on the topic. The number of textbooks used in this 
analysis is small and therefore might not account for all of the material that is covered 
within the field.  It is also important to keep the use of historical writing in perspective.  
Textbooks are one of many tools that historians and history teachers might use.  The 
value of identifying and categorizing the different types of moral claims may outweigh 
these limitations in many cases.  Future research on the way that history texts are utilized 
in the classroom and how teachers engage students over moral statements found in the 
text might be useful to further address these limitations. 
Nicholls (2005) also pointed out that textbooks are relied upon as heavily to teach 
history in many other countries as they are in the U.S.   As such, an international 
comparison of the inclusion and function of moral statements in historical writing might 
shed further light on the issues that I present in this dissertation.  In particular, 
historiographical and linguistic research on Japanese textbooks would, I’m sure, provide 
interesting insight in to another element of the historical coverage of both the atomic 
bombs and the Japanese-American internment. 
The presence and variance of moral statements within the texts suggests that 
teachers ought to and often do play a significant role in the presentation of ethical issues 
in history.  The results of this study offer insight into what treatment moral statements are 
given in history texts.  The development of the taxonomy, in particular, can serve to help 
the authors of history text and history educators further consider how they present ethical 
issues in history. 
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CHAPTER TWO: THE PROBLEM OF MORAL STATEMENTS IN HISTORY 
Introduction   
In his essay, “On Human Dignity,” Kenzaburo Oé tells the story of a Japanese 
runner born in Hiroshima on the day that the Atomic bomb was dropped.  The man was 
selected as the last man to carry the Olympic flame in the 1964 Tokyo Olympic Games.  
He describes the runner, stating that if he “had keloid scars or some other sign of 
radiation injury, that is if he had been an unmistakable A-bomb casualty, then I would not 
have objected to the selection.”  Instead, Oé continues, “the middle distance runner 
actually chosen had a perfectly healthy body; we were impressed by his stamina as he ran 
at full speed in the huge stadium, with the smile of one free of all anxiety” (Oé, 1996, 
p.108). 
Though Oé was troubled by the selection, he explains that he was much more 
troubled by the reactions of an American journalist who “might be expected to 
understand Japan and the Japanese people” (Oé, 1996, p.108).  Oé describes the 
journalist’s reaction as follows: 
[T]he American journalist was displeased because the young man, born in 
 Hiroshima on the atomic bombing day, reminded Americans of the atomic bomb.  
 He preferred to erase all traces of Hiroshima from the American memory.  Worse 
 still, this preference occurs not only to the American mind.  Do not all leaders 
 who at present possess nuclear weapons also wish to erase Hiroshima from their 
 memories? (Oé, 1996, pp.108-109).   
This anecdote is indicative of the kinds of debates that arise at the intersection of 
epistemology and ethics.  Can and should knowledge of particular historical events be 
erased?  Should historical events like the use of the atomic bombs remain in public 
memory in the service of moral progress?  What are we to make of ethics in history? 
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In this chapter, I introduce the problem of making moral statements in historical 
writing.   First I give an overview of how epistemology and ethics have traditionally been 
addressed in the philosophy of history.  Next, I explain how both epistemology and ethics 
are relevant to the problem of making moral statements in history.  Finally, I show that 
this problem is also significant to education, specifically to the writing of history and the 
use of texts in the history classroom.  
The Philosophy of History   
 Questions about the nature of history and the limits of historical knowledge are the 
focus of scholarship among philosophers of history (Day, 2008).  This sub-discipline is 
often shared by philosophers and historians, and addresses questions about what it might 
mean to conduct good historical inquiry, and what questions ought to come under its 
purview.  Much of the focus of the philosophy of history is on epistemology, or the 
nature and limits of knowledge.  An example of how this issue arises in the work of 
historians would be the setting of a research agenda in history.  Historians need to decide 
not only what they want to know, but also which sorts of research questions are 
appropriate given the purposes of their research program. The epistemological position 
that historians takes may determine, in part, what knowledge they are looking for, which 
part of history they will direct their inquiry toward, and what their research program will 
entail (Nicholls, 2005). In addition, there are epistemological questions relevant to 
historical research agendas such as, which questions are most likely to add to the body of 
historical knowledge given the time period or culture being studied?  What kinds of 
questions are capable of being inquired into?  In what body of literature, set of 
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documents, or artifacts are historians likely to find evidence for or against their 
hypotheses?  And how can historians best determine which, among conflicting 
perspectives on historical events, are most reasonable (Novick, 1998)?  These questions 
sometimes give philosophers of history cause to ask a broader and more troubling 
question: whether historical knowledge exists at all? 
Methodological questions about historical inquiry also often concern knowledge 
claims. Historians make statements about which questions and methods are most likely to 
yield historical knowledge, what might count as evidence in support of a claim, how 
hypotheses are to be tested, what constitutes a good historical explanation, and so on.  
They also consider the role of theory in constructing knowledge about the past. In 
addition, historians develop methods that maintain a level of epistemological objectivity 
by, for example, guarding against bias, and make claims about the role of the community 
of professional historians in shoring up the objectivity of each other’s work (Reizler, 
1948). 
 In addition, the implications of, and biases involved in historical knowledge pose 
interesting challenges to historians.  As in science, they consider the social, political, and 
ethical implications of historical knowledge, and whether everyone has the right to the 
knowledge produced by historians.  For example, a historian might be presented with a 
conflict if her research shows that seemingly unethical actions actually had consequences 
that were justifiably positive (Morison, 1951).   
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 Many scholars, such as Tucker (2001) view philosophy of history as similar to the 
philosophy of science because of the epistemological and ethical questions they each 
pose.  Philosophy of science and philosophy of history share common epistemological 
questions about the nature, role, and reliability of evidence; the way in which scientific or 
historical knowledge can shape notions of truth; what counts as historical or scientific 
knowledge; the explanatory power of various theories; and whether it is possible to have 
scientific or historical truth (Nagel, 1961).  Both disciplines have gone through similar 
progressions with regard to schools of thought, as well.  Both were dominated, at least for 
a time, by positivist theories, and, recently, both have been given a great deal of attention 
by postmodern theorists (Day 2008).  In addition, both science and history are often cited 
in everyday discussions as informing moral statements.   
While moral statements have been the focus of many discussions within 
philosophy of science, perhaps in part because scientific research often requires the 
approval of ethics review boards, there has been much less discussion about the nature of 
moral statements made in the course of historical inquiry (Lemon, 2003).  Instead, the 
philosophy of history has traditionally set most of its attention toward the areas of 
epistemology and metaphysics.  In the following sections, I outline epistemology as it is 
relevant to the philosophy of history and also begin to make a case for the uniqueness of 
moral statements in history, arguing that more attention ought to be given to them, 
particularly to the way that they are presented in textbooks. 
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Epistemology 
   In considering the role of knowledge in debates over history, Lifschultz and Bird 
(1998) ask, “How do we know, or come to know, what we know?” (p. xxxi). They 
emphasize that historical knowledge is extremely complicated and write:  
 [E]ssentially, this question of epistemology pertains no only to one’s self, but also 
to the societies we inhabit.  From the earliest days of human consciousness, 
mythical accounts of the past have guided entire peoples and nations...the 
narratives and myths we love with may often have great merit.  They bind 
generations to one another and can establish a rich and textured context through 
which most people navigate difficult lives in harsh terrain.  For many the tales of 
their ancestors provide security and even certainty in a world where there are few 
safe havens.  Yet, the legends and stories of our past have at moments also 
blinded us to ourselves and have on more than one occasion become accessories 
to acts of willful and powerful destruction (Lifshultz and Bird, 1998, p. xxxi). 
  
Epistemology is the branch of philosophy that is concerned with knowledge and 
related questions about truth, belief, and the warrant for knowledge and belief.  The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Online cites the following as being the questions 
that concern epistemology:  “What are the necessary and sufficient conditions of 
knowledge? What are its sources?  What is its structure, and what are its limits?  How are 
we to understand the concept of justification?  What makes justified beliefs justified?”  
(Streup, 2010).  Epistemology is often situated within particular disciplinary contexts or 
focused on particular subject matters.  As Streup notes, “epistemology is about issues 
having to do with the creation and dissemination of knowledge in particularly areas of 
inquiry” (2010). What counts as justification for belief or warranted knowledge differs 
across subject matters such as science, social science, and religion.  
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 The philosophy of history focuses much of its attention on epistemic questions 
about the nature and limits of historical knowledge. In history, epistemological inquiry 
addresses themes and questions that are specific to the discipline (Tucker, 2009).  The 
fundamental epistemological questions include:   
(1) What does history consist of- individual actions, social structures, periods and 
regions, civilizations, large causal processes, divine intervention?  (2) Does 
history as a whole have meaning, structure, or direction beyond the individual 
events and actions that make it up? (3) What is involved in our knowing, 
representing, and explaining history?  (4) To what extent is human history 
constitutive of the human present? (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
Little, 2011) 
 
The most fundamental questions about historical knowledge center on its nature 
and possibility, and traditionally, there have been six distinguishable positions within the 
philosophy of history that aim to address them.  As the table below outlines, there are a 
variety of philosophical positions that address the nature of knowledge, ranging from 
idealism, the belief that all knowledge is derived from mental processes (Lennon, 2011); 
to realism, the belief that knowledge derives from the mind’s encounter with reality 
independent of it (Pendlebury, 2011).  Realist theories include empiricism, the theory that 
knowledge is gained through (sensory) experience; and rationalism, the theory that 
knowledge is gained through rational thought (Feyeraband, 1985).   
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Table 1:  Epistemological Theories and Views about the Possibility of Knowledge 
Theory View of Knowledge 
Realism The belief that reality exists independently of the 
mind, which can take various forms including 
empiricism and rationalism. 
      Empiricism Knowledge derives from the senses and sensory 
experience 
      Rationalism Knowledge derives from reason, which provides a 
source of justification for belief. 
Idealism The belief that all knowledge and experience are 
mind-dependent (some idealists believe that reality is 
also mind-dependent while others believe that reality 
can exist independent from the mind). 
Constructivism Knowledge is constructed by experts in a given field 
(e.g. scientists, historians, or social scientists) and 
does not exist independently of this construction. 
Historicism A hermeneutical view of knowledge, which 
maintains that history is critical to understanding 
knowledge, i.e., that knowledge cannot be separated 
from particular historical paradigms or contexts. 
 
More recently, theorists have also addressed constructivism, the belief that all 
knowledge about a subject is constructed by experts in that subject and that it cannot be 
separated from these experts and theories (Slezak, 2010); and historicism, the theory that 
knowledge ideas cannot be separated from their history, and that the questions raised 
within a particular historical context must be addressed from within that context as well 
(Iggers, 1995).  Constructivism and Historicism are more often schools of thought within 
the continental tradition, while the other positions mentioned are more traditionally 
associated with the analytic school of thought. 
There is also much gradation in philosophical positions over the nature and 
justification of historical knowledge, which is slightly different than questions about the 
possibility or nature of historical knowledge.  Peter Novick (1998) describes the 
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discipline of history as having gone through large-scale ideological, theoretical, and 
methodological shifts over the last century.  Novick claims that there was a long period of 
time in which there was consensus within the discipline of history as to the 
methodological practices and ethical obligations of professional historians.  He describes 
the early methodological goal of professional historians as being to, “discover and record 
the objective truth about the past.  To cooperatively and cumulatively move ever closer to 
the perhaps ultimately unattainable but eminently approachable goal of a true and 
complete picture of the human past” (Novick, 1998, p. 29). Recently, he claims, there is 
less consensus over the idea that historians’ accounts can be justified by a direct 
correspondence to historical truth, and the field has divided among various new positions 
about historical warrant. Such positions include positivism and consensus-reliant 
theories, and are summarized in the table on the following page. 
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 View of 
Historical 
Truth 
Historical 
Methodology 
Epistemology of Ethical and 
Political Statements 
Positivism Historical 
Knowledge 
is acquired 
through 
empirical 
means. 
Objective, 
empirical 
data.   
History is about fact, not value, 
so historical knowledge should 
not- in fact, cannot- include 
ethical or political statements. 
Consensus-Reliant 
Theories 
Objectivity is 
the measure, 
but historical 
knowledge 
rests on 
warranted 
conjectures, 
not absolute 
truth.  
Methodologi
es are 
reconstructed 
in light of 
newly 
discovered 
biases. 
Consensus-
reliant 
historians 
look for 
trends, 
cycles, and 
clear shifts, 
and pay 
attention to 
the 
dependence 
of historical 
knowledge 
on 
theoretical 
perspectives.   
Historical events, actions, and 
practices are open for ethical and 
political evaluation, but only to 
the extent that those evaluations 
are reasonable, in light of the 
historical evidence.   
Post-Structuralist Various 
epistemologi
cal stances or 
methods are 
possible and 
ought to be 
used as a 
means 
toward 
producing 
historical 
knowledge. 
Plural 
methods may 
be necessary. 
Because all 
knowledge is 
assumed to 
be 
constructed 
from various 
perspectives 
and attempts 
are made to 
articulate, 
rather than 
reconcile 
these.   
It is assumed that each work of 
history is constructed using 
ethical and political 
perspectives; the diversity of 
which is cultivated.  Historical 
actions and practices can be 
evaluated ethically and 
politically using multiple 
epistemological stances.   
Table 2:  Views of the Justification of Historical Knowledge
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Philosophical positions toward the nature and justification of historical 
knowledge include positivism, consensus-reliant views, and post-structuralist views.  
Positivism is the view that truth in the social sciences can be as objective as truth in 
the natural sciences (Connelly, 2008).  It supposes that knowledge is based on what is 
verifiable through empirical means, and not metaphysical, supernatural (e.g. 
teleological) explanation and that facts about the past ought to be known the way 
scientific facts are known.  The past might serve as informative to present ethical and 
political issues, but historical statements cannot involve ethical or political 
evaluations of facts about the past in and of themselves.  In discussing methodology, 
positivism asserts that testimonies ought to conform to one another, and be congruent 
with documentary and physical evidence, and that the historian is justified in 
discrediting those testimonies that rely on speculation or fanaticism.  The historian is 
to preserve facts, not make value judgments about them, because there is a gap 
between facts and values.  Historians and scientists work in the realm of facts.  
Ethical and political evaluation only enters in to historical practice in reflection over 
the historian’s own methodology, e.g. making judgments over which testimonies 
ought to be included in a narrative, and which research questions should be asked.  
Historians might inform the present, but it is not the work of historians to evaluate the 
past (Turchin, 2003).  
In contrast, consensus-reliant views maintain that objectivity ought to be the 
measure in historical work, but argue that all knowledge is at least somewhat theory-
laden. These views are positivistic to a degree, but hold that in every case of inquiry, 
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truth reduces to warranted conjectures, not absolute knowledge. Consensus-Reliant 
views maintain that the historian needs to recognize his or her own epistemological 
context and biases and ought to acknowledge the role of theory in the construction of 
knowledge.   Much of their focus is on falsification, and they maintain that theories 
may sometimes be falsified by the introduction of new evidence.  Further, they 
maintain that falsification is more likely than the unqualified verification of existing 
ideas, and may result in the reevaluation of theories or mindsets.  In other words, 
rather than assert that currently-warranted knowledge is truth, they maintain that it is 
not yet falsehood.  However, because consensus-reliant historians take seriously the 
dependence of historical knowledge on theoretical perspectives, they see that it is not 
always possible to choose between two conflicting historical hypotheses by simply 
testing them against the evidence.  When the available evidence equally supports 
conflicting theory-dependent hypotheses, these historians seek ways to choose among 
them or reconcile them.  Like positivists, they believe that objectivity is a matter of 
consensus or convergence: of evidence, perspectives, interpretations and theories.  
They see divergence among these as a problem, i.e. as a call for further inquiry (Paul, 
2011). 
Because consensus-reliant historians allow for a more dynamic relationship 
between knower and the would-be-known, some are willing to include overt ethical 
and political value statements as part of the work of historical inquiry.  For some, 
historical conditions can serve as real options for the present.  Some consensus-reliant 
historians evaluate the events, actions, and practices of the past, ethically and 
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politically, as a means of considering them as options for the present.  They do not 
view history as simply a series of natural causes and effects in the social world, but as 
test cases of individual ethical and political judgments, and collective movements, 
that can inform the present.  The past can be evaluated in two key ways: 
1. In a more positivistic way, that is, as a means of demarcating points with an 
aim toward moral progress (Kant, 1784).
2
 
2. By determining clear shifts between historical periods and assessing their 
value and replicability.  The past consists of actual options, and their 
conditions are the key to replicating these, if desired (Habermas, 1962). 
Not all views toward the acquisition of knowledge across the sciences and 
social sciences fall neatly in to these two categories, however.  Some theorists 
(Berlin, 1954) view multiple methods as necessary for the acquisition of knowledge 
about history.  These views typically maintain that in the case that a method (e.g. the 
scientific-inductive method) is agreed upon, dissensus is inevitable, and rational 
debate can mediate this with regard to considerations that are relevant to the context.  
Also compatible is the view that syncretism and skepticism ought to be avoided.  
With respect to moral or political statements, allowing for multiple methods isn’t 
clearly compatible with any specific view toward value.  Compatible with this kind of 
epistemic pluralism, however, is the view that axiological disagreement is valuable 
and “ineliminable” and that evaluative dissensus can be useful because it allows for 
                                                 
2
  For more discussion of this point, see the teleological view in chapter four. 
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accommodation when the focus is on multiple, rather than a singular value or 
evaluation.  Historians can evaluate for the sake of informing the present, but these 
things can also be evaluated on their own right.   
Ethics 
Ethics is the branch of philosophy that is concerned with the nature of good, 
bad, right, wrong, and so on.  Ethicists might be interested in ethical theory, the 
branch of ethics that addresses questions about the criteria for moral action; or meta-
ethics, the branch of ethics that explores the nature of moral facts and moral language.  
Alternatively, scholars in ethics might work in applied ethics, focusing their inquiry 
on what is morally correct in particular situations (Sayre-McCord, 2007).  Though 
ethical theory and metaethics might certainly be addressed in historical research, 
ethics in history is most closely related to applied or practical ethics because it is 
focused on particular problems and frames the use of ethical theories and ideas 
(Singer, 2011).  Discussions of ethics in history often employ the same type of moral 
statements that are typical of discussions of politics and current events in classes and 
between scholars where ethics is a secondary concern.   
Dray (1989) discusses the problem of moral statements and history and notes 
that, as is common when philosophers “consider problems relating to practice in other 
disciplines,” (p. 92) it has been “urged…that before philosophers set about 
prescribing models of explanation for historical inquiry, they should pay more 
attention to the way investigations in this field actually proceed” (p. 92).  Dray argues 
that philosophers are likely to do much deeper levels of concept analysis, particularly 
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when it comes to ethics, than the disciplines that they are studying.  He urges 
“philosophers of history to pay some heed” (p. 92) to this warning.  Still, he claims, 
there is some reason to look at the nature of moral statements in history; it just ought 
to be done by looking first at the work of historians. 
Dray, cautious of generalizing, choose an article, “The Mexican War:  A Study 
in Causation,” (Graebner, 1980) that he claimed was not an unusual piece of 
historical writing and looked at the way moral statements were used in it.  Dray found 
that moral statements were not only embedded throughout the article, but that these 
statements were also rhetorically effective.  Dray goes further, saying that in making 
the case for a causal connection between particular events, Graebner uses terms like 
“free” and “forced” and gives them a “distinctively moral meaning” (pg. 103).  Some 
other examples that Dray gives are references to “Polk’s diplomacy represented as 
being ‘aggressive’…”  and claims that “Mexico is said to have been under no ‘moral 
obligation’ to alienate territory in order to ease diplomatic and military pressures, the 
task of easing them apparently belonging to the United States.” Dray points out that 
smaller phrases such as referring to the money president Polk offered for the Rio 
Grande as “proper payment,” or suggestions that negotiations “mattered little,” are 
effective at persuading the readers.  Ultimately, Dray concludes that in this particular 
article  “the function of such value judgments is generally to represent the Americans 
as enjoying freedom of maneuver and the Mexicans as lacking it- to show that, 
morally speaking at least, the Americans did not have to do what they did whereas the 
Mexicans did” (pg. 103). 
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Moral statements in history seem to fall in to two categories:  backward-
looking statements, that is, statements about whether particular historical events or 
actions were right or wrong, and forward-looking statements, statements that aim to 
use history as a source to inform the present or future.  Moral language is utilized in 
history, moral statements are made or revealed intentionally or unintentionally, and 
these are all persuasively employed (Novick, 1998).  However, there is much 
variation between statements, and a good deal of time could be spent outlining the 
particular kinds of statements that are made in history.  In chapter four, I will look at 
history texts in order to make sense of the kinds of statements that are made in 
history, and will discuss the relevance of these statements to the writing and use of 
history texts.   
The Problem of Historical Knowledge to Making Moral Statements in History 
Skepticism 
In subject areas such as history and science, analytic philosophers have often 
focused on the relationship between the logical analysis of empirical evidence and 
philosophical speculation about knowledge and values.  Some, such as Williams 
(1985) remain skeptical that empirical knowledge of history ought to be used in 
making any kind of claim about value, including moral statements, statements about 
the quality of life in a particular time period, and so on.  In other words, Williams 
views the gap between fact and value in history as being too wide to bridge. 
On the other hand, some scholars claim that empirical knowledge about 
history does offer a valuable springboard from which it is possible to make moral 
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statements (Collingwood, 1946). This is the conflict that is at the core of this project.  
In the following chapters I will tease out these two positions and those that fall 
between them, first looking at how moral statements are made in history texts and 
then discussing the relationship between empirical knowledge and value in making 
them. 
The two skeptical positions that serve as the theoretical backdrop for this work 
hold different views of the possibility of making moral statements about history.  This 
contrast is best illustrated by describing their positions on the two broad categories of 
moral statements, those that are forward-looking and therefore aim to use history in 
order to make sense of the present in moral terms, and those that are backward-
looking and aim to make some sort of moral appraisal of the past in its own terms.  
The work of Bernard Williams and R.G. Collingwood best illustrates this contrast. 
The following table outlines the differences between their approaches to skepticism, 
which I will explain further in the following sections. 
 
Two Types of Skepticism               
Type of Statement Bernard Williams R.G. Collingwood 
Forward-Looking  Williams claims that we need 
historical knowledge in order 
to deal with the problems of 
modern day. 
Impossible, because matters of 
preference would simply get in 
the way.  Unnecessary because 
it is nobody’s business to 
“advance or frustrate the 
schemes of history.” 
Backward-Looking Relativism of Distance: 
skeptical of the possibility of 
determining the truth-value of 
backward-looking statements. 
Possible through the historical 
method, which ought to be 
reenactment. 
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 Relativism of Distance 
Bernard Williams was a British philosopher whose work centered primarily 
on moral philosophy and the history of philosophy.  Educated at Oxford, Williams 
took a position as the Knightbridge Chair of Philosophy at Cambridge in 1967 and 
remained there until the mid-1980‘s when he moved briefly to Berkeley after which 
he returned to Britain and took a position in Moral Philosophy at Oxford.  Williams 
was critical of theories of morality such as utilitarianism and deontology and was 
skeptical that systematic approaches to moral philosophy could ever capture the 
complexities of moral discourse (Chappell, 2010).  Williams held that it was both 
possible and necessary to make forward-looking moral statements in order to deal 
with the problems of modern day.  He argued, however, that it was impossible to 
make backward-looking moral statements.   
Williams (1985) held that forward-looking statements were necessary because 
we need historical knowledge in order to deal with the problems of the modern day: 
What matters more, and may have something to do with comfort or with 
optimism, is how far notions of objective truth can be extended to social 
understanding… it [social knowledge or understanding] need not seek to join 
the natural sciences in providing and absolute conception of the world, but we 
need to have some reflective social knowledge, including history, that can 
command unprejudiced assent if the better hopes for our self-understanding 
are to be realized.  We shall need it if we are to carry out the kind of critique 
that gives ethical insight in to institutions through explanations of how they 
work and, in particular, of how they generate belief in themselves (pg. 199). 
 
Though Williams claims that this sort of historical knowledge is necessary, he 
is skeptical that empirical knowledge about history will offer much that is useful in 
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making moral statements.  Williams addressed this problem by proposing a relativism 
of distance (pg. 162).  He argues that we can not use “the language of appraisal- 
good, bad, right, wrong, and so on”  (pg. 161) when talking about societies whose 
epistemic conditions vary greatly from ours because they are distanced by time, or, in 
Williams’ words, because they are “not real options for us; there is no way of living 
them” (pg. 161).   He claims that these options pose a “notional” rather than “real” 
(pg. 161) confrontation to our ethical positions, and, as such, are not suitable for 
ethical appraisal.  He maintains that the more chronological distance there is between 
the beliefs of a particular time and our own, the more implausible it is to believe we 
can make any sort of insightful moral statements about it.  The best we can do is be 
thankful that we do not live at a time when practices we view as unethical are 
common, and wonder whether our lives would be well-lived under conditions that we 
view as ideal, or close to ideal.    
About discussions of responsibility to the future, Williams follows this same 
line of reasoning and argues, “We should not try to seal determinate values into future 
society.”  Though, he claims, “we also have reason to take some positive steps.  We 
should try to leave resources for an adequate life and, as means to that and as part of 
it, we shall try to transmit what we take to be our knowledge” (172-173). Williams 
takes a skeptical view toward the idea that moral truth could transcend great 
distances, placing epistemology at the center of his views on ethics and history.  In 
other words, we can say little more about what we perceive as historical ills than that 
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we are glad to live under social and political conditions where these are only notional 
confrontations.  
Williams uses the example of a traditional Japanese samurai warrior to 
illustrate this point.  Is it clear that we can say that the samurai practices are unethical, 
and, further, that we have progressed past these?  We could, but it is difficult to call 
this progress, because we do not know that, given we had the ability to transcend 
historical boundaries; we would not subscribe to the same sorts of values.  In 
addition, it is unclear that the samurai would view current society as a progression 
from his own practices.  He might, on the other hand, think that our practices are 
evidence of a sort of moral drift.  Heysse (2010) describes Williams’ position as the 
belief that moral statements about history, “cannot be vindicated and therefore 
amount to nothing more than an empty compliment to ourselves” (p. 226).  
 Is it necessary to take such a skeptical view of our ability to engage in 
meaningful ethical inquiry about history?   If historians aim to sidestep such 
uncertainty, they must decide how this can best be done.  If, on the other hand, such 
skepticism is impossible to avoid, it must be reconciled with the process of doing 
history, and the ultimate aims of it, particularly if making moral statements is 
unavoidable in historical research, as Dray claimed that it was. Heysse (2010) 
identified some potential criticisms of Williams’ relativism of distance: 
 Williams’s opponents may have good reasons for arguing that relativism of 
 distance depends on 1) the ‘unwarranted’ suggestion that judging the past 
 ‘would be insensitively parochial’,   2) ignores the possibility that making 
 statements ‘can be the upshot of a kind of reflection which encompasses the 
 possibility of learning from conflicting outlooks’, and 3) is threatened by 
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 incoherence, since it requires us to ‘combine recognizing the conflict and 
 standing by one’s own outlook with disclaiming any interest or even 
 possibility of making some negative assessment of the other?’ (Heysse, 2010, 
 pp. 231-232).
3
 
Whatever we make of such skepticism, its consideration of belief, knowledge, and, 
ultimately, truth presents a challenge to the utility of historical methods and aims in 
making moral statements.   
Historical Idealism 
Collingwood (1965) held a skeptical view that could be understood as directly 
opposing Williams’ view.  Collingwood held that it was impossible to use history in 
order to make forward-looking moral judgments because matters of preference would 
simply get in the way.  Additionally, he believed that it was unnecessary to make 
forward-looking statements because it was nobody’s business to “advance or frustrate 
the schemes of history” (Colllingwood, 1965, p.77). Collingwood’s historical method, 
however, warranted historians in making backward-looking moral statements 
because, he claimed, the historical process ought to be one where historians reenact 
the past in their own minds in order to understand the past under the epistemic 
conditions of the historical subjects who they studied. Collingwood was a 20
th
 century 
philosopher who held positions at Oxford University.  Though he wrote widely in 
philosophy, he is, perhaps, best known for his work on the philosophy of history and 
the philosophy of art. While other philosophers of history (such as Dray, 1989) also 
agree that it is possible to make moral statements in history, Collingwood’s proposed 
                                                 
3
 Heysse acknowledges that the quotations here come from John McDowell’s “Critical Notice 
of Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy by Bernard Williams” which was originally published in 
Mind XCV (1986), p. 384. 
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historical methodology presents an extreme contrast to the skepticism of Williams. 
This methodology, often called Collingwood’s historical idealism and sometimes 
claimed to be historicism (D’Oro, 2010), proposes and intimate relationship between 
empirical fact and value in history. 
 For Collingwood, it is reenactment that ought to be the methodology of the 
historian.  Collingwood claims that for the historian to complete her task she should 
reenact the thoughts of the subject she aims to study in her own mind, in order to 
recover the original meaning.  For Collingwood, “all history is the history of thought” 
(Collingwood, 1994, pg. 214).   So, to study military history is not to study the history 
of battles, the names of those who stood to win them, and the dates on which they 
won, and it is not, in Collingwood’s words, a history of “weary marches in heat or 
cold, or the thrills and chills of battle or the long agony of wounded men.”  Rather, it 
is “a description of plans and counter-plans:  of thinking about strategy and thinking 
about tactics, and in the last resort of what the men in the ranks thought about the 
battle.”  (Collingwood, 1970, pg. 110). For Collingwood, reenactment ought to focus 
on much more than the major events in history, because: 
A great many things which deeply concern human beings are not, and never 
have been, traditionally included in the subject matter of history.  People are 
born, eat and breathe and sleep, and beget children and become ill and recover 
again, and die; and these things interest them, most of them, at any rate, far 
more than art and science, politics and industry, and war. Yet none of these 
things have been traditionally regarded as possessing historical interest. Most 
of them have given rise to institutions like dining and marrying and the 
various rituals that surround birth and death, sickness and recovery; and of 
these rituals and institutions people write histories; but the history of dining is 
not the history of eating, and the history of death-rituals is not the history of 
death (Collingwood, 1956, pp.46). 
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This view of historical knowledge, called “idealism” by most scholars who 
have studied Collingwood, but called “strong anti-realism” by Collingwood himself, 
presents a sharp contrast to the skepticism of Williams not in its methodology, but in 
its view toward the possibility of making moral statements about history.   
 Interestingly, though Collingwood thought it was possible to make moral 
statements about history, he did not think that this was the goal of history. To 
illustrate this point, he offered the example of Huckleberry Finn’s reaction to the 
story of Moses, and his relief when he found out that Moses was dead, because he 
“took no stock in dead men.”  Collingwood claims that: 
Huckleberry Finn may here stand as the babe or suckling out of whose mouth 
the historian is to learn wisdom.  Moses is dead, and there is no need to get in 
a sweat about him.  It is nobody’s business to give him advice, or to advance 
or frustrate his schemes; nobody is called upon to work for him or against 
him, to excite himself about choosing to be pro-Moses or anti-Moses, to allow 
his feelings to be inflamed with partisanship or opposition, or even to 
commend or regret, applaud or condemn, label as good or bad.  (Collingwood, 
1965, pg. 77). 
While Collingwood might think it is unnecessary to think in moral terms about 
history, he does claim that empirical facts provide the knowledge necessary to do so. 
And, as Dray noted, necessary or not, moral statements are being made in history.   
Relevance to Historical Scholarship and Teaching 
The problem of historical knowledge, what we can really know about the past, 
and how that knowledge can inform moral statements, is one that confronts historians, 
curriculum writers, history teachers and educational policy makers. This problem may 
not be as simple as it seems on the surface, however.  There are many ways to think 
about historical knowledge, and the way in which history is taught can influence the 
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very way that history is thought about.  Historians and history texts commonly 
include moral statements about the past (Dray, 1989).  Perhaps of equal consideration 
is the fact that these texts are commonly used by history teachers and professors with 
their students, who are asked to make moral statements about history.  Is it enough to 
simply ask whether an event was “right” or “justified”?   
As posed, the question leaves much to interpretation.  Would the answer to 
this question be the same if the poser were to ask whether, given the knowledge and 
beliefs held at the time, the actors were justified?  Would it change if the question 
were asking if the same action would be justified in the present, given current beliefs 
and values?  Further, is it important to consider the role that knowledge played in the 
actor’s decision to engage in the specific action?   
Contemporary Debates 
The notion of bias and disagreement in history, especially given present 
conflicts over race, ethnicity and revisionist history, have recently brought the 
problem of moral statements in history to the public’s attention.  The North Carolina 
Department of Public Instruction is considering revising eleventh grade curriculum to 
include only those events that occurred after 1877, which would exclude material on 
the civil war.  Similarly, in March 2010, Texas State Board of Education officials 
voted to approve new curriculum standards that critics argue (Smith, 2010), are too 
dramatic a revision of existing curriculum, and reflect religious biases. 
Since January, 2010, The Texas State Board of Education has been meeting to 
vote on new curriculum for its secondary school history classes.  This vote is the 
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source of much controversy, particularly because much of the debate is over which 
historical figures to include in the new curriculum.  Critics argue that the historical 
figures who officials are considering removing from the curriculum, figures such as 
Thurgood Marshall and Cesar Chavez (Smith, 2010), are, the majority of the time, 
non-Anglo, or represent events that are politically liberal, such as “discussion of the 
separation of church and state,” and events that highlight “race and ethnicity.”   
Further, critics argue, the proposed Texas curriculum asserts that “the 
Founders envisioned America as a divinely inspired Christian nation” (Tanenhaus, 
2010).    These examples represent just one instance of the “culture wars” that are 
evident across American history curriculum.  These “wars” take on different forms, 
based on disagreement over race, religion, politics or ideology, but remain forceful in 
revising history.  Tenenhaus (2010) claims:  “Today it is not regional or ethnic 
identity, but ideological commitment that threatens to submerge larger “national 
myths.” But one thing remains unchanged from 50 or 60 years ago. As Americans 
struggle to see where they are going, they continue to gaze fondly at the past — and 
to see in it what they like” (Tenenhaus, 2010).  Each of these is an example of using 
empirical knowledge about history to make moral or political statements, illustrating, 
as Dray pointed out, that history is simply not value-neutral. 
Two other recent events in history education that have been debated among 
the mainstream media are Virginia’s Confederate History Month and the passing of a 
ban on Ethnic Studies classes in Arizona.    Virginia governor Bob McDonnell 
declared April “Confederate History Month” for the state of Virginia in 2010.  In 
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doing so, however, the governor made no mention of slavery as part of this history, a 
fact that upset many, including President Obama, who claimed that this was “hateful” 
and that the governor’s declaration coupled with the fact that he made no mention of 
slavery was inappropriate (Jonsson, 2010).  Governor Jan Brewer, of Arizona, signed 
a law in May, 2010, that banned Ethnic studies classes from Arizona’s public schools, 
which she justified by saying that students ought to value each other as individuals 
rather than as members of particular ethnic groups (Cruz, 2010).  Many critics claim 
that this bill, which will withhold state funding from schools who do not comply, 
actually targets Mexican American studies programs (Cruz, 2010). 
The above examples illustrate the necessity of looking at moral statements in 
history, particularly those statements that are included in history texts, as these serve 
as the primary source of information for students of the discipline.  As a starting 
point, in the next chapter I will explore specific moral statements that are made in 
history texts, looking at two key things: the types of moral statements that are actually 
made in history texts, and the evolution of these statements over time.   
The curriculum used to teach U.S. history courses is often the subject of 
debate (Romanowski, 2009).  In particular it seems that these debates center on the 
content, rather than the methodology of such courses: which events are given 
coverage, how they are portrayed, and so on.  The emphasis of these debates is often 
driven by values.  There are cultural clashes in Virginia and Arizona and tension over 
the role of religion in the schools in Texas and North Carolina.  These conflicts often 
manifest in discussions over history curriculum and texts.  
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Why Textbooks? 
 
 While education has moved toward integrating more diverse resources into the 
classroom, textbooks have remained the principal tool of elementary through higher 
education history educators. Vanhulle (2009) pointed out that “The only historical 
instrument that pupils are familiar with is in most cases the history textbook” (pg. 
263).  Still, he claims, professional historians are often not inclined to study textbooks 
philosophically and noted that, “Although textbooks have been studied in search of 
bias, nationalism and racism no research has been conducted on the philosophical 
basis of the construction of historical knowledge in these textbooks”  (pg. 265). There 
is little scholarship, then, to use when these debates over the knowledge constructed 
by textbooks arise.  What is included in texts is likely to determine what students 
know about history and events that are excluded are likely to send a message about 
what is viewed as irrelevant or unimportant.  Textbooks package the knowledge that 
authors consider to be worth knowing.  
The curriculum debates illustrate that deciding what knowledge ought to be 
“sanctioned” is no small task because there is little consensus over which knowledge 
is valuable.  Cooper (2007) claimed that what is important for education is not truth, 
but truthfulness.  He takes truth to be a property of beliefs, and truthfulness to be a 
virtue that can be had by people.  Cooper follows Bernard Williams in proposing that 
truthfulness 
[D]evolves in to two dispositions, ‘accuracy’ and ‘sincerity.’  These are the 
dispositions, roughly, to take due care that one’s beliefs are warranted, and ‘to 
come out with what one believes (Williams 2002, pg. 45).  The former requires 
honesty, objectivity and effort when forming one’s beliefs; the latter, a 
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determination to communicate what one believes and, more generally, to be 
trustworthy communicators who do not mislead (Cooper 2007, pg. 81). 
 
But truthfulness on the part of educators is more difficult to understand than 
ever in light of debates over what the “true” portrayal of events in U.S. History ought 
to be.  Inevitably, what is included in textbooks will also have an effect on what 
teachers teach and how truthful they are able to be.  Cooper (2007) acknowledges this 
problem and claims that: 
…the older imperative of honest, open dissemination of research results often 
conflicts with a newer insistence that nothing must be published that might 
undermine traditional beliefs supposedly important to a people’s, or ethnic 
group’s, sense of identity” (pg. 81). 
 
Much more could be said about these debates over the morality and history 
textbooks and as well as the implicit moral statements made by historians in 
textbooks which include, for example, what is included or excluded and how it is 
covered (Romanowski, 2009). In addition, it is worth considering whether historians 
are warranted in making such statements.  Before doing so, however, it seems logical 
to take a look at the texts themselves in order to see what kinds of statements are, in 
fact, being made, and what kinds of knowledge are necessary to make them.   
In this chapter, I offer my own epistemological positioning and give an 
overview of the historical background to the cases that I analyze, namely, the 
Japanese-American internment and the bombings of Tokyo, Hiroshima, and 
Nagasaki.  I also outline my study and explain and my findings, which will include a 
taxonomy of the sorts of moral statements that are made about those events in 
college-level history texts.  In the following chapter, I will discuss the implications of 
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this study by outlining the kinds of knowledge that are relevant to each of the 
categories of moral statements and how they relate to the problem of historical 
knowledge. 
 
43 
 
CHAPTER THREE: ETHICS IN HISTORY 
 
The decision to drop the atomic bomb was the most tragic taken in the long 
course of American history.  It may well be that only so drastic a step could 
have ended the war and thereby averted the losses which an invasion would 
have brought on both sides.  On the other hand, thoughtful observers have 
wondered whether the American government, with Japan essentially beaten and 
on the verge of capitulation, had exhausted all possible alternatives before at last 
having recourse to drop the bomb- whether there was not evidence of 
negotiation or demonstration that those have first been attempted, with the 
bomb laced in reserve as a weapon of last resort.  Here perhaps the doctrine of 
unconditional surrender had terrible consequences.  Certainly, the bomb 
terminated the war, but it also placed America for many years in an ambiguous 
position before the world as the only nation to have employed so horrible a 
weapon. (Blum, 1963). 
Overview of the Study 
 
 The above passage was written in a textbook that was published in 1963, less 
than twenty years after the end of World War II.  Though the passage could easily 
have been pulled from a textbook on ethics, the subject matter of the text is actually 
college-level U.S. History.  It is not alone in exploring ethical matters. History 
textbooks often include moral statements, though their central aim is not to prompt 
ethics discussions, but rather, to portray historical events. Passages like the one 
above, which are infused with moral statements, illustrate why debates over the 
content of U.S. history curriculum are likely to get so controversial.   
 In chapter two, I claimed that historians often make moral statements in 
history textbooks that lack the epistemological warrant that are required of historical 
claims in the same textbooks.  Because the focus of history textbooks is primarily on 
the historical claims, moral statements frequently go unnoticed by teachers and 
students reading the textbooks, and moral statements may even be taken to be 
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historical claims (Novick, 1998).  Because textbooks are used as educational tools, 
the use of moral statements in history texts calls for pedagogy that enables students to 
reflect on the ethics of the historical events that they are studying.  This is especially 
complicated in light of the fact that ethical statements in history often do resemble 
historical claims.  Moreover, ethical statements in history texts often differ from 
ethical statements in applied or theoretical ethics because in history ethical claims 
might be forward or backward-looking, while ethical statements in more traditional 
contexts are more commonly general or forward-looking.   
 Because moral statements that are made in history textbooks differ from both 
traditional moral statements and historical claims it seems worthwhile to take a close 
look at the nature of these claims.  Toward this end I designed a study that explores 
the types of moral statements that are made in history textbooks.   In this chapter, I 
describe the research methods that I used for this study, explain some limitations of 
the study, and discuss my findings, which will include a theory of moral statements 
that are made about those events in college-level history texts.  The type of taxonomy 
that I propose is the sort that was called for by Hill (2009).  Hill claimed that a 
taxonomy of moral judgments was needed to identify and categorize moral statements 
by type in any case where “non-ethical statements” were made alongside “ethical 
statements.”  He proposed that this might be done by a close look at the language of 
ethical and non ethical statements. Satris (1987) offers some indication of how we 
might distinguish ethical sentences or statements from factual claims.  He claims that 
ethical sentences, “expresses or calls for non-cognitive attitudes and not merely 
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beliefs” (p. 91).  Satris also distinguishes ethical sentences from imperatives by 
claiming that ethical sentences can “appropriately be called true or false” (p. 91).  The 
nature of history textbooks means that historical claims and moral statements are 
difficult to identify and separate, and as such a taxonomy that is based on the 
particular language use of each claim was an appropriate choice for this study. I 
follow Satris’s lead in identifying statements as moral statements if they have emotive 
meaning and a truth-value.  In the following chapter, I will discuss the implications of 
this study by setting out the kinds of knowledge that are relevant to each of the 
categories of moral statements and how they relate to the problem of historical 
knowledge. 
 In order to better make sense of the relevance of knowledge to moral 
statements in history, I wanted to examine how moral statements are made in history 
texts.  I chose two historical events, (1) the Japanese-American internment, and (2) 
the bombings of Japanese cities during World War II because both address the same 
general relationship, that of the U.S. and Japan during World War II. However, they 
provide very different vantage points, as the literature surrounding the internment 
considers domestic policy and defensive strategy, while the literature about the 
bombings deals with foreign policy and military tactics.
4
  These events, though 
similar in some ways, have very important differences.  For instance, while the 
development and use of the atomic bombs was highly publicized after they were 
dropped, much of the American public had no knowledge of the internment until long 
                                                 
4
 This is an observation that I made in my analysis, though this sentiment is also noted by 
Daniels (2002) and Lorenz (1996) 
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after the war had ended.  The story of the A-bombs is highlighted in almost every 
textbook, while the internment was, until recently, included in very few.  Daniels 
notes this in an article on the social history of the internment.  He claims: 
Historians, however, generally caught up in the triumphalism generated by 
victory in World War II, paid little attention.  In what was perhaps the most 
noteworthy American History college textbook of the immediate postwar 
decades- and certainly the most liberal- Richard Hofstadter and his 
collaborators in a 1957 volume of 758 pages could say only this in their 
section on ‘Civilian Mobilization’ during World War II: ‘Since almost no one 
doubted the necessity for the war, there was much less intolerance than there 
had been in World War I, although large numbers of Japanese-Americans 
were put in to internment camps under circumstances that many Americans 
were later to judge unfair or worse.’ Such other college textbooks of the time 
as Morison and Commager’s, ‘The Growth of the American Republic’ made 
no mention of what happened to Japanese Americans.  By the 1970’s 
however, books about the wartime incarceration began to be included in 
college reading lists.  The general ignorance among the educated continued 
well in to the 1980s.  I remember being asked by a bright senior history major 
at a good eastern liberal arts college in the mid-1970’s if the wartime 
incarceration I had lectured about ‘really happened’ and if it had, why had he 
not heard about it (Daniels, 2005, p. 164). 
 
Bosworth (1994), Goodman (1984) and Nichols (2006) echo this problem of 
the treatment of the relations between the U.S. and the Japanese during World War II 
by examining textbooks from Japan, Europe, and the U.S. and comparing the way 
that events were covered.  Each concludes that the telling of these events tends to be 
done from the victor’s perspective, with the atomic bombs treated as a victory and the 
internment either justified, excluded or, less frequently, given apologetic treatment.  
The different treatments of the two events made for interesting and useful comparison 
during my analysis of U.S. History textbooks. In addition, the events are relatively 
contemporary to one another, and relatively recent in history. 
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Research Methods 
 
 Research on school textbooks requires unique methodology because the 
material in texts is for a specific, educational purpose.  In one sense textbook research 
sheds light on the structure and dynamics of education and the contexts for which 
they are a tool.  In another sense, as Nicholls (2006) points out, “[T]he level and type 
of engagement will depend on how the textbook is used in history classes” and as 
such, “identifying and accepting differences of perspective across international 
samples of school history textbooks does not in any way tell us how students may be 
encouraged to engaged with the perspective(s) offered” (Nicholls, 2006, pg. 40).  
Because of this potential gap between the content of the texts and their utility as 
pedagogical tools researchers have to be critical in their analysis of the texts and the 
implications that they draw from their findings.  
 In order to maintain the integrity of research centering on school textbooks 
researchers need to follow careful methodology.  While researchers use various 
methodologies in doing textual analysis, analysis of textbooks is idiosyncratic and 
calls for its own considerations.  Nicholls (2003) proposed methodology specific to 
textbook research in order to address these concerns.  
 Nicholls claims that “there are few things more important than a precisely 
defined sample” (pg. 3). Consideration should be given to the number and quality of 
texts at the very least, and perhaps other factors depending on how the nature and 
focus of the study.  He identifies eleven types of qualitative analysis for textbook 
research, namely: hermeneutic, linguistic, cross-cultural, discourse, contingency, 
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historiographical, visual, question, critical, structural, and semiotic.  My study used a 
combination of what Nicholls identifies as linguistic analysis, that is, analyzing the 
use of language in order to identify statements as moral and not historical, and 
historiographical research, which is “used to investigate the manner in which the 
discipline of history is conveyed,” or in this case how history is conveyed in ethical 
terms.  These two methods were more fitting than Nicholls’ other methods because 
linguistic analysis allowed for me to focus particularly on the moral statements that 
were made in historical texts while historiographical analysis allowed for a broader 
look at the function of moral statements in the writing of history.   
 Pingel (1999) lays out a “list of criteria for analysis” which helps to orient the 
researcher to the texts that he or she is studying.  This list of criteria has five main 
categories: 1) textbook sector components, 2) formal criteria, 3) types of texts/mode 
of presentation, 4) analysis of content, and 5) perspective of presentation.  In addition, 
Pingel advocates the development of categories related to the researcher’s own 
question.  Nicholls advocates this use of categories, which is typical in many forms of 
textual analysis, and claims, “the analysis of school textbooks is based on registering 
differences, identifying patterns, and making comparisons.”  Such categories are 
useful for the analysis of texts, though as Nicholls notes they also run the risk of 
allowing bias to creep in to the analysis if the researcher favors the categories that he 
or she believe to constitute “good” knowledge.   
 In my study, the development of a taxonomy included the development of two 
categories of moral statements- forward and backward looking- and multiple 
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subcategories of statement types.  I avoided the risk of bias that Nicholls points out 
because in identifying the two main categories of moral statements I do not claim that 
one type of statement is somehow better than the other, but view them both as 
different ways to use historical knowledge to inform moral statement making.  In the 
next section I will describe the specific methodology that I used for my study in more 
detail.  
Selection of the Texts 
 I selected textbooks to analyze based on the following criteria:  (1) Inclusion 
of moral statements which are the data points for analysis.  (2) Coverage of the events 
selected.  (3) Accessibility in archives or through libraries.    (4) Inclusion on the 
American Textbook Council (ATC) list of widely adopted texts, a council made up of 
professional historians and independent of publishers that aims to insure the quality of 
history curriculum through, for example, its list of widely adopted texts.  (5) 
Suitedness for a college-level audience.
5
  Ultimately, I selected sixteen textbooks, 
seven of which included coverage of both the bombings of Japanese cities and the 
Japanese-American internment.  The texts are outlined in the table below: 
                                                 
5
 Information about this criterion was gathered through the use of publishers’ websites, lists of 
textbooks in special collections, and online syllabi available to the public on various university 
history department websites. 
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Table 3: Overview of Textbooks Used for Analysis 
Textbook Author Time Period 
covered in the 
text 
Year 
of 
publica
tion 
Internment 
covered? 
Bombings 
covered? 
The Making of Modern 
America 
Canfield & 
Wilden 
Post World War 
II 
1954 Yes Yes 
A History of American 
Democracy 
Hicks, 
Mowry, and 
Burke 
Post World War 
II 
1956 Yes Yes 
History of a Free People Bragdon & 
Proctor 
Post World War 
II 
1958 No  
Freedom Under Law: A 
History of the United 
States 
Platt & Neff Post World War 
II 
1962 No Yes 
The National Experience Blum, 
Catton, 
Morgan, 
Schlesinger, 
Stampp & 
Woodward 
Post World War 
II 
1963 No Yes 
History of Our United 
States 
Eibling, 
King, & 
Harlow 
Vietnam Era 1964 No Yes 
Our Nation from its 
Creation 
Platt & 
Drummond 
Vietnam Era 1964 No Yes 
This is America’s Story Wilder, 
Ludlum & 
Brown 
Vietnam Era 1966 No Yes 
The United States: A 
History of a Republic 
Hofstadter Vietnam Era 1967 No Yes 
The United States:  A 
World Power 
Hofstadter 
& Miller 
Vietnam Era 1972 No Yes 
The Oxford History of the 
American People 
Morison Post-Vietnam 1985 Yes Yes 
The Unfinished Nation Brinkley Post- Vietnam 1997 Yes Yes 
A History of the United 
States 
Jenkins Post-Vietnam 1997 No Yes 
A History of the American 
People 
Johnson Post-Vietnam 1997 Yes Yes 
We the People Carroll Post 9/11 2002 Yes Yes 
A People’s History of the 
United States 
Zinn Post 9/11 2003 Yes Yes 
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Nine of the textbooks did not include coverage of the Japanese-American 
internment.  Initially, I looked at 36 textbooks, but ruled some out because they did 
not cover either event in much depth or because, after further research, the texts were 
more likely to have been used in high school classes than college, even though they 
were listed as college-level texts in the special collection. I used textbooks that were 
available through libraries in my own geographic region, inter-library loan services, 
or in a large and comprehensive special collection of historical textbooks available at 
Harvard’s Graduate School of Education Gutman Library.  I chose this historical 
textbook collection over others available because its list was the most comprehensive 
and included the most college-level texts. Comprehensive historical textbook archives 
also exist at Stanford University and Princeton University, but these archives 
contained primarily K-12 textbooks.  Harvard’s Gutman Library contains the most 
complete selection of textbooks available, and also holds a large volume of post-
World War II textbooks which are difficult to find elsewhere.   
 The last criterion is to ensure the likelihood of the work being written by 
historians and containing moral statements.  It is certainly the case that there are 
moral statements made in K-12 history texts, however, an initial look at the literature 
indicated that the ethical claims made in college-level history texts are, in general, 
more likely to contain explicit ethical claims.  In order to decrease the variability 
between the types of claims and the methods of presentation, looking particularly at 
college-level texts seemed a sound decision.  The knowledge gained through this 
analysis may be applicable to other grade levels and contexts, but, because college-
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level texts are more consistently in line with the criteria, I limited my analysis to 
them.   
Historical Periods 
After selecting the texts, I classified them into four distinct historical 
categories because according to Giroux (2004) educational practices and the content 
of educational materials are likely to change following a large-scale crisis or periods 
of wide social and political change.  Keeping this in mind, I divided the texts into 
time periods that were likely to illustrate a change in the moral tide or political 
sentiments. I selected the particular time periods outlined below because the moral 
and political issues that were a focus of the time correlate with military events that 
reflect high tension over warfare, the use of weapons, and racial, religious, or cultural 
profiling
6
 with regard to the military. 
  As a result of such tension over the practices of the U.S. military, I 
considered them to be the most relevant political changes to the two events that my 
study focuses on, namely the Japanese-American internment and the dropping of 
bombs over Tokyo, Nagasaki, and Hiroshima. 
The first category are those texts written from 1945-1960, the period 
immediately following World War II which encompasses the Korean War and 
arguably the onset of increased U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War.  I selected this 
                                                 
6
 By profiling here I am referring to cases in which political or military action was used against 
particular people because of some kind of cultural, ethnic, or group identity.  Examples of this 
include the relocation of Japanese-Americans during World War II, the profiling of Islamic 
citizens after the September 11th terrorist attacks, or the blacklisting of Americans believed to 
be involved in Communist activities during Cold War tensions by politicians such as Joe 
McCarthy. 
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period because it reflects the end of World War II, immediately after the bombings 
took place in Japan and the time period in which Japanese citizens were allowed to 
return to their homes.  The second category is made up of texts written from 1961-
1975, during the Vietnam era.  This time period was selected because tension over the 
actions and practices of the military reached at an all-time high.  Additionally, there 
was increased conflict over social issues such as civil rights, which implied that there 
might be an emphasis on issues regarding race in the text, a topic that is relevant to 
the friction over the treatment of Japanese citizens during World War II.  The third 
category contains texts from 1976-2000, representing the time between the end of the 
Vietnam War and the September 11
th
 terrorist attacks.  This time period saw 
heightened tension over military issues during the gulf war and conflicts in Kosovo, 
Somalia, and Iran.  The final set is Post-9/11, and includes texts written from 2001-
present.  This time period was selected particularly because it was a time when 
military technology and the relevance of race, religion, culture, and the profiling of 
each of these was highly debated.  Table 4, below, outlines these time periods as well 
as the historical events relevant to each. 
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Table 4:  Outline of the Historical Time Periods 
Time Period Years Major Historical Events 
Post-World War II 1945-1963 The Cold War; Immigration and 
Naturalization Act; Korean War; Growing 
Conflict in Vietnam;  
The Vietnam Era 1964-1975 Vietnam; Civil Rights Movement; Protests 
on College Campuses; Cuba Missile Crisis; 
Height of Women’s liberation; Space Race 
Post-Vietnam 1975-2000 Sandra Day O’Connor; HIV crisis; Gulf 
War; Kosovo; Somalia; Clinton scandal; 
stable economy; Oklahoma City bombing; 
Hostage crisis in Iran; rise in school 
shootings; Y2K 
Post 9/11 2001-2011 September 11
th
; War on Terror; First 
minority president; Natural disasters in 
South East Asia, Japan, and the U.S.; 
Declining Economy 
 
Methods of Analysis 
 
The method I used in this study was content analysis, which is often used as a 
method of qualitative research in the humanities and social scientists when working 
with data sources such as texts or media (Nicholls 2003).  One aim of concept 
analysis it is to “describe and make inferences about the characteristics of 
communication” (Holsti, 1969) by looking at which material is presented and which 
is excluded, how it is presented, and to whom.  Content analysis is commonly used to 
identify key words and phrases in a text and to organize them into categories.  More 
specifically, in this study I used two types of content analysis identified by Nicholls 
as linguistic and historiographical analysis (Nicholls, 2003, pg. 3) 
 Before beginning my analysis, I looked through the texts in order to get a 
general sense for what the broad categories of moral statements might be.  The initial 
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look confirmed what had been proposed in the theoretical literature, that is, that moral 
statements in history fall into two categories: forward-looking and backward looking.    
As I began my analysis, I looked through each text to identify any sections that 
discussed either the Japanese-American internment or the bombings of Japan.  I then 
read each of these sections closely, identifying each moral claim that was made and 
putting it in either the forward-looking or backward-looking category.  After placing 
each moral statement into one of these two categories, I looked at each category and 
tried to make sense of the differences between the types of statements that were 
within each category.  To do this, I looked closely at each statement and identified 
what its aim was.  If that kind of statement had already been identified, it was placed 
within an existing subcategory, and if it was new I identified a new subcategory.  In 
the end, the two categories, forward-looking and backward-looking, were broken 
down into six subcategories.    Forward-looking statements were either teleological or 
took an “experiments in living” view of history.  Backward-looking statements 
included those that were statements about actions within their own historical context; 
statements about actions and events that reflected hindsight; Statements about the 
ethics of causation; and categorical statements.  I explain these further in the 
following section.   
Epistemological Positioning 
Perhaps the most difficult part of this project is providing the historical 
background of the cases that I use for my analysis here. What makes it difficult is 
writing from an epistemologically neutral position, or without making any sort of 
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values claims in retelling the past to others.  As I explained in Chapter 2, historians do 
not simply report facts, they have methods much more rich which involve making 
statements about belief, about probability, about value.  Even those positions toward 
history which themselves claim that history ought to be value neutral make a moral 
statement, namely that historians ought to work in the realm of facts, and also imply 
that it is possible to do so. 
 Judgments about whether historians ought to work with facts or values are 
just the beginning, however.  Historians make many different judgments: which facts 
are relevant to the narrative? Which evidence ought to be taken seriously, and why? 
Which conjectures should be followed through to their ends? Which can be falsified, 
and how?  Each of these relies on the making of epistemological judgments, that is, 
judgments about knowledge, about truth, and about belief.  These epistemological 
judgments are, in part, what can make historians so persuasive.  They’re not simply 
reporting on a story, they’re deciding what that story should be, and how it ought to 
be told.  
 Epistemology is relevant to ethics also.  In making claims about ethics, we 
often make assumptions about the beliefs or intentions of others.  We might think 
very poorly, that is, about someone who harmed another if we believed that she had 
knowledge that what she was doing was harmful.    In contrast, if we think that the 
same person unintentionally harmed someone, we would be much less likely to be as 
harsh in our judgments of her, we might, instead, just say that she was ignorant and 
would have acted differently if she had held different beliefs.     
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History makes this sort of appraisal doubly complicated.  Some views hold 
that it is well within the historian’s purview to make ethical judgments about the 
subject of his or her study.  Still, others claim that the historian ought to, or is only 
able to, work within the realm of facts. Regardless of whether we take it to be the 
historian’s task to make this appraisal, or we hold that this ought to be a task 
consigned to some faraway corner of ethics, it is hard to deny that making ethical 
judgments about practices and times that are foreign or simply notional to us presents 
some challenges that do not otherwise exist.  Events and practices presented by the 
discipline of history make belief and intentionality complicated, to say the least.    
While we might not necessarily believe that history is the study of human thought, as 
Collingwood believed, it is likely that we will at least try to make sense of the past on 
our own terms, that is, by reasoning through the ethical dilemmas the way we do in 
real time.   
In other words, it’s tempting, in reading about a public health crisis in history, 
to ask the questions that are second nature when we think about public health, such as 
“were the proper measures taken to stop the spread of infection?”  Epistemology is 
entirely relevant to such questions.  What we think about an agent’s beliefs or 
intentions might, ultimately, come to influence what we think about such problems.  
If the public health crisis took place at a time when little was known about the spread 
and containment of infections diseases, then we might not assess the situation by 
claiming that a public health official ought to have done a better job at these things.  
Our assessment of this situation will hinge on what we know or think about the 
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agent’s beliefs and knowledge. 
As I’ve tried to outline in the first few chapters, epistemological positions can 
take a variety of forms.  Ethical claims, too, vary in the way that they are structured, 
and in the propositions that are central to them.  Because it is very difficult, perhaps 
impossible, to present historical events with epistemic neutrality, I do not set out to do 
that here.  Instead, I acknowledge that my own epistemological position is likely to be 
intertwined with the material that I hope to outline.   
In offering an overview of the cases, it is my assumption that in order to make 
moral statements, we ought to assume, as Goldstein does, that: 
 Points are never so settled- statements so irrevocably established- that they 
 serve as criteria for the truth of all subsequent statements.  In history, as in all 
 spheres of inquiry, what is established is always subject to revision in the light 
 of what may subsequently come up (Goldstein, 1976, pg. 46).   
 
In addition, like Collingwood, I believe that history is, at least in part, an exercise in 
epistemology.  In doing writing history, I think that it is intuitive to try to puzzle 
through the beliefs and intentions of those being studied.  As such, like Collingwood, 
I believe that evidence and the historical process are both relatively fluid, and may 
change form depending on the questions that the historian asks. First I assume that 
what can be taken to warrant a claim depends on the questions that the historian is 
seeking to answer, which minimizes, or even precludes in some cases, the role of 
consensus in historical inquiry.  I also assume that it is unavoidable that the notion of 
historical truth will change when information is introduced counterfactually.  The 
knowledge that we have about the past, as well as the beliefs we hold about justice, 
rights, and so on, will almost certainly change our views of ethics.  I also think that 
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Williams’s ‘relativism of distance’ (1985) is warranted in some cases, but with one 
qualification.  I think that this relativism is only something to take seriously when 
asking specific questions that rely on an understanding of the conditions and 
experiences of those being studied.  Asking whether an agent was right or wrong 
given his or her own beliefs, for example, might warrant a consideration of the 
relativism of distance.  In contrast, it might not be as necessary to consider this 
distance if posing a question about whether features of a particular historical time 
period might be worthwhile additions to current society.  In a sense, whether we can 
actually experience these features as historical agents did is far secondary to the 
comparative benefits and harms it may bring about in our own society. 
With this positioning in mind, in the next chapter I lay out a theory of moral 
statements in history that is grounded in the data from my study of history texts.  This 
theory explains the types of moral statements that are common in historical writing.  I 
begin by discussing the differences between forward and backward-looking 
categories of moral statement and then outline the kinds of statements made within 
each category.  Next, I analyze the particular texts used in my study and discuss the 
use of moral statements in them.   Finally, I discuss the relevance of historical 
knowledge to this theory.
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CHAPTER FOUR:  A THEORY OF MORAL STATEMENTS IN 
HISTORICAL WRITING 
 
Types of Moral Statements in Historical Writing: An Analysis 
 
In this chapter I outline the various types of moral statements made in 
historical writing based on the results of the study that I outlined in chapter three.  
This theory of moral statements in history includes two broad categories of moral 
statement:  forward and backward-looking.  Each of these categories has sub 
categories within it.  Throughout the chapter I will use examples from history 
textbooks, some from this study and some that were not included in the study, to 
illustrate the differences between the various types of statements. 
Forward-Looking Statements 
In the last section I explained that I had two very broad categories of moral 
statements identified before beginning my study.  The first of these categories is 
forward-looking statements, that is, moral statements that draw on history to inform 
the present or future.  Within this category of statements I found that there were two 
particular types of statements: teleological statements and experiments-in-living 
statements.  Teleological statements look to history to tell a broader view of moral 
progress, while experiments-in-living statements resemble a model proposed by Mill 
(1859), and view history as a social trial-and-error of sorts, allowing people in the 
present to observe various ways of living as they have been practiced throughout 
history. These views have in common the fact that they look at history as evidence 
that might inform the present in some way. 
61 
 
There are quite possibly other kinds of forward-looking moral statements that 
might be made by historians in their work.  A historian could, for example, cite 
historical examples of wrong-doing to argue against repeating this wrong-doing in 
contemporary contexts.  Alternatively, a historian might draw parallels between 
immoral actions in history and current events, reasoning by analogy that the current 
events might be wrong on the same grounds as the historical events were viewed as 
wrong. As I will discuss further in the findings, I did not come across statements such 
as these in my study, perhaps because of the nature of the sources that I used.  In my 
study, I analyzed only sections of the text specifically on the bombings of the 
Japanese cities and the internment of Japanese-American citizens.   
It is possible that these events were referred to as examples in textbook 
sections that cover other time periods in different ways.  A historian writing on more 
recent bombings that caused civilian casualties might, for example, cite the bombing 
of Hiroshima as a case of immoral military action.  This statement would not be 
found in the textbook section on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, however, so would not 
have been included in this study. Further research might show that this is quite 
common, or even that it constitutes a category of moral statements that I did not 
recognize, specifically the types of statements made about events in sections of 
history textbooks that actually have different events as their focus.  
 In my study, however, I focused only on moral statements made about events 
in sections that focused particularly on them in order to analyze the event as a whole 
because this provides more depth and context specifically because the events are 
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isolated and narrow in scope.  In the following section, I will further explain the types 
of forward-looking moral statements that I did identify in this study, teleological 
statements and experiments-in-living statements.  While in some cases there might be 
some overlap between categories and particular statements may well fit in to more 
than one category, I have used them here in the category that they fit most closely 
within. 
          Teleological Views. Teleological moral statements are statements that look at 
particular events and actions to paint a broader picture of moral progress or regress. 
Teleological moral statements are an extension of theories put forward by Leibniz 
(1714), Kant (1784), Hegel (1837), and others who viewed history as a closed set of 
related events.  They believed that history had a distinct beginning and end and that it 
was, in essence, a web of causal events.   Historical events, in teleological statements, 
serves as gauges of sorts, checkpoints, or positions on a timeline, all in order to track 
moral progress.  Periods of infirmity might be compared to periods of "health" in 
order to make statements about their frequency, duration, and so on.    
 For a statement to be teleological it must meet at least one of the following 
three criteria:  (1) Teleological statements may situate the event being described 
within a broader picture of moral progress.  (2) Teleological statements may compare 
the event to previous events in order to make the case that moral progress is or is not 
being made.  Finally, (3) teleological statements may cite a future goal of moral 
progress in order to justify or criticize a particular event or action.   Wilder (1966) 
uses a teleological statement.  He writes: 
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 In all the great changes of recent times, the United States has taken a leading part.  
Out of these great changes there could grow a new and better world, but only if 
the nations of the world can maintain law and order and keep the peace.  In this 
chapter we shall learn why the peace which people hoped for at the close of 
World War I did not last.  We shall see how the leaders of certain countries, 
anxious to gain power, brought about the outbreak of the World War II.  And we 
shall learn what steps the United States has taken to maintain peace, including the 
development of the Manhattan project.
7
 
 This example illustrates the third criteria for teleological moral statements.  
Wilder, in this case, justifies the Manhattan Project in light of a future aim of moral 
progress, namely growing a “new and better world” and the maintenance of peace.  A 
second teleological statement can be found later in the same section of Wilder’s text: 
 People of every period of history have probably believed their own times to be 
unusual.  Our fathers, our grandfathers, our great-grandfathers all have believed 
that there was something special about the age they lived in.  Our own age is no 
exception.  But perhaps in the 1900’s we have better reasons for thinking so than 
earlier generations had.  Twice within 25 years our world has been engulfed in 
terrible wars.  The family of nations has grown tremendously as many peoples in 
Asia and Africa have gained independence.” (Wilder, 1966) 
 This example illustrates the second criteria for teleological moral statements.   
Wilder seems to reflect on moral progress when he claims, “...perhaps in the 1900’s 
we have better reason for thinking so than earlier generations have,” and citing 
examples of both moral progress and moral regress. In contrast, the following 
example from Blum meets three criteria for teleological moral judgments: 
 Victory thus came- but in a way that converted triumph into tragedy.  The Second 
World War was at an end.  Perhaps twenty million men had been under (illegible) 
total casualties amounted to over a million with nearly three hundred thousand 
dead (illegible) battle.  Now, in the autumn of 1945, the world stood on the 
threshold of a new epoch in human history- an epoch incalculably rich with 
                                                 
7
 The Wilder text was found in Harvard’s Gutman Library archives and because of its poor 
condition, the page numbers were illegible. 
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hazards and potentialities.  With faltering steps mankind was entering the atomic 
age. (Blum, 1963, p. 634) 
 Blum first situates the atomic bombs within the larger context of World War 
II, and then he considers the moral progress or regress indicated by this event in his 
statement, “the world stood on a threshold of a new epoch in human history- an epoch 
rich with hazards and potentialities.”  Finally, with his nod toward the age that 
“mankind was entering” he makes an appeal toward some kind of future aim or 
progress. 
   These examples, though very different from one another in some regards, 
each illustrate teleological statements in the way that they appeal to a broader picture 
of moral progress or moral regress.  Not all forward-looking statements make such an 
appeal.  In the next section I will outline a different sort of statement, experiments-in-
living, where an author does not appeal to history as a moral continuum but rather a 
series of different moral periods, some valuable and some shameful or tragic. 
Experiments in Living.  The second type of forward-looking statement that I 
identified in this study was the type of statement that looks to history to offer 
experiments in living of the sort that Mill (1859) discussed. Experiments-in-living 
statements are forward-looking statements because they look beyond the virtues and 
vices of a particular time period and aim to assess whether the general state of affairs 
of a particular time period is desirable as an option for people in the present.  For a 
statement to be an experiments-in-living statement it must aim to take the moral 
temperature of the time period and then to decide whether this temperature is 
desirable or not.   
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 These statements tend to portray history as a closed set of human contexts 
that can inform the present (Turchin 2008, Habermas 1991).  They follow Mill (1859) 
in looking to history to provide experiments in living, that is, information about ways 
in which people have lived which can be used to weigh the relevant benefits and 
drawbacks of each.  Such statements rest on an assumption that historical conditions 
are always live options given the ability to recreate the conditions under which they 
existed.  Statements that view historical conditions as live options might be 
statements about which systems are best to return to, which histories should repeat 
themselves, and so on.  This view might hold that a particular period of societal 
health might be isolated, and that the conditions that constructed it might be 
replicated in order to repeat it.    
Hofstadter (1967) made the following experiments-in-living statement in 
response to discussion about developments in science spurred by the A-bomb: 
And yet, as such social crises as the depression at home and World War II 
 abroad showed, the conventional values of civilization- mercy and justice, 
 liberty and democracy, the humanistic values Krutch and others considered 
 ‘childish’- were not to be shirked because of the ascribed indifference of the 
 universe to them. (p. 542). 
 Hofstadter makes much of the overall values of society at the time of the 
Atomic bombs and makes a claim that, overall, the time period was an inherently 
good one.  In other words, it looks at what might be viewed as a negative occurrence, 
that of the Atomic bomb, and looks to the events surrounding it to see if it was part of 
a particularly bad historical context or whether it was an outlier of sorts to its context.   
This is an experiments-in-living statement because it isolates a particular time period 
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in an attempt to assess it on the whole. This kind of statement differs from a 
teleological judgment because it looks to history as a more distant entity.  
Teleological statements aim to chart a clear path of progress and so point to causal 
sequences and a connectedness between events.  In contrast, experiments-in-living 
events point to isolated time periods as being options for the present.  On this view, 
one time period might be better than the one preceding it, but might also be followed 
by a time period that is worse than it.  There is no necessary progression from one 
time period to another. 
 Hicks (1956) makes an experiments-in-living statement about the use of the 
atomic bombs, however he views the atomic bombs as symptomatic of an all-around 
low point in human history: 
 The most terrible war in history had ended in the most terrible display of 
 force.  The world has proven lawless and penetrable to great scientific 
 gambles. (Hicks 1956, pg. 640). 
Mumford (1946) used an experiments-in-living statement to illustrate his distress at 
the use of the atomic bombs just a year after Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  He wrote: 
 You cannot talk like the sane men around a peace table while the atomic bomb 
 itself is ticking beneath it.  Do not treat the atomic bomb as a weapon of 
 offense; do not treat it as an instrument of the police.  Treat the bomb for what 
 it actually is:  the visible insanity of a civilization that has ceased to worship 
 life and obey the laws of life.  Say that as men we are too proud to will the rest 
 of mankind’s destruction even if that madness could for a few meaningless 
 extra moments save ourselves.  Say we are too wise to imagine that our life 
 would have value or purpose, security or continuity, in a world blasted by 
 terror or paralyzed at the threat of terror (Mumford, 1946, p. 286). 
 Mumford is clearly expressing a terror caused not only by the use of the 
atomic bombs, but in a world that would allow for such weapons to be used.  His 
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statement, therefore, reflects not only the action of using the bombs but the moral 
condition of the world at the time.  Oé (1995) expressed similar horror in a world that 
would allow for the use of weapons like the atomic bombs.  He wrote: 
For my part, I have a kind of nightmare about trusting in human strength or in 
humanism; it is a nightmare about a particular kind of trust in human 
capability... My nightmare stems from a suspicion that a certain ‘trust in 
human strength,’ or ‘humanism’ flashed across the minds of the American 
intellectuals who decided upon the project that concluded with the dropping of 
the atomic bomb on Hiroshima.  That ‘humanism’ ran as follows:  If this 
absolutely lethal bomb is dropped on Hiroshima, a scientifically predictable 
hell will result.  But the hell will not be so thoroughly disastrous as to wipe 
out, once and for all, all that is good in human society.  That hell will not be 
so completely beyond the possibility of a human recovery that all mankind 
will despise their humanity merely at the thought of it.  It will not be an 
unrelieved hell with no exit, or so devastatingly evil that President Truman 
will, throughout his life, be unable to sleep for thinking of it.  There are, after 
all, people in Hiroshima who will make the hell as humane as they possible 
can... I suspect that the A-bomb planners thought in such a way; that in 
making the final decision they trusted too much in the enemy’s own human 
strength to cope with the hell that would follow the dropping of the atomic 
bomb.  If so, theirs was a most paradoxical humanism. (Oé, 1995, p. 434). 
Like Mumford, Oé’s statement asserts that the bomb isn’t simply an isolated action 
but reflective of a more general moral trend. Experiments-in-living statements, along 
with teleological statements, make up the category of forward looking moral 
statements in history textbooks.  In the following section I discuss backward looking 
moral statements. 
Backward-Looking Statements 
 The second broad category that I identified in my initial look at the data was a 
category of backward-looking statements, that is, statements about history that look to 
make an ethical assessment of the past without expressly relating them to present or 
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future debates.  My analysis of the texts identified four distinct types of statements 
that fit in to this category: 1) virtue statements, 2) categorical statements, 3) 
consequentialist statements, and 4) hindsight statements.   
The first type of statement, virtue statements, aims to conduct a moral 
appraisal of historical actions or events given the context and considerations of the 
time that they occurred.  Statements that take in to account hindsight intend to reflect 
on the moral status of a particular action and event with regard to what we now know 
about the time period and how the events of the particular time period played out. 
Hindsight statements aim to make this appraisal with a bit of reflection, and may also 
include moral statements about blame and praiseworthiness of various actions and 
events.  Consequentialist moral statements, following in the tradition of John Stuart 
Mill (1859) and Jeremy Bentham (1789), also draw on hindsight to make their 
appraisal.  In contrast to hindsight-statements, however, consequentialist statements 
look to the state of the world brought about by the particular event or action in order 
to make their appraisal.  Finally, categorical statements assess actions and events in 
history by holding them to universal moral principles such as, “torture is categorically 
wrong.”   
My study’s coverage of the category of backward-looking moral statements is, 
in my view, more comprehensive than that of the category of forward-looking moral 
statements.  As I explained in the introduction to the section on forward-looking 
moral statements, some forward-looking moral statements may have been excluded 
from the analysis based on the fact that they used one event to form the basis of a 
69 
 
moral statement about another through analogical reasoning.  In other words, a 
forward-looking statement, for example, “the suggestion to quarantine patients with 
HIV was dismissed because as we have seen in cases such as the Japanese-American 
internment, quarantine is not only immoral but may lead to political unrest” would be 
included in the textbook section devoted to the subject that it is being informed (e.g. 
in this case the HIV crisis), rather than in the section that is used to inform (e.g. in 
this case the Japanese-American internment).   
In contrast, backward looking statements commonly place the emphasis on 
actions and events themselves, regardless of their instrumental value. A 
consequentialist moral statement, for example, would determine the moral status of 
using the atomic bombs based on the general attitudes toward warfare that was 
brought about by the use of the bombs.  In the following sections I will go into greater 
detail about each type of backward-looking statements by outlining the criteria for 
each kind of backward-looking moral statement, and by offering some theoretical 
explanation and examples for each type of statement. 
Virtue Statements. Virtue statements about historical actions are often made 
with consideration given to the circumstances at the time when the event took place.  
For the purpose of this study, moral statements were identified as virtue statements if 
they 1) emphasized the presence or lack of a desirable trait or characteristic; and 
further, 2) if they place the virtue within the context of the moral and political tides of 
the time at which they occurred. Often, I found virtue statements to be the statements 
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that were made most casually, frequently in a rhetorical manner, and not as an 
intentional way of making a particular point. 
Virtue theory is most closely associated in the history of philosophy with 
Aristotle (350 BCE/2009).  The theory dictates that in order to live well individuals 
must have a good character, valuing honesty, courage, and so on.  A person who 
flourishes, then, will be the person who truly internalizes virtues and exercises them 
correctly.  The individual would not merely act honestly, for example, because it 
seems the simplest way to act or because they fear some consequence of being 
dishonest.  Rather, the virtuous person acts honestly because he or she values being 
an honest person.  Hursthorse (1991) writes:  
 I suppose that one of the reasons we find it so hard to come to terms with the 
 Holocaust is that pre-Nazi German society looks so like our own at the same 
 period, and we are forced to the unpalatable conclusion that if it happened 
 there because of lack of virtue in its members, we must have been similarly 
 lacking and might have gone the same way (p. 264).  
 Hursthorse, in this case, was using a virtue ethics approach to morality.  She 
claims that the right thing to do is always what a person with good character would 
do.  The Nazis, she argued, were not people of good character, not people who 
possessed virtues or exercise them adequately.  Virtue statements in history texts tend 
to fault similar instances of poor character or to praise cases of excellent character.   
 Carroll (2002) included the following virtue-based account of the internment 
of Japanese-American citizens: 
  ‘Has the Gestapo come to America?’ responded one angry Nisei citizen.  
 Forced to sell all their property at a fraction of its value and transported to ten 
 concentration camps in remote parts of the country, most Japanese Americans 
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 stoically accepted exile as proof of their loyalty.  As administered by the 
 government’s War Relocation Authority, which called the prisoner’s 
 ‘colonists,’ the camps were bleak, primitive, and terrifying. (p. 432) 
  Carroll is implying that the Japanese Americans relocated during World War 
II were virtuous because they were loyal and stoic in the face of conditions that might 
otherwise turn people to vices.  Others, the implication seems to go, might not have 
been stoic or loyal to the United States when confronted with “bleak, primitive, and 
terrifying” conditions.  This example illustrates the first criteria for virtue statements, 
the stipulation that virtue statements emphasize the “presence or lack of a desirable 
trait or characteristic.”   
 Brinkley (1997) makes a similar kind of statement about the virtue of the 
atomic bomb and the traditionally American characteristics that he claims that the 
bomb illustrated: 
 The A-Bomb was a ‘democratic’ bomb, and was spurred on by the genuine 
 idealism of the peculiarly American kind.  Many of those involved in 
 Manhattan felt that liberty and decency, the right of self-government, 
 independence, and the international rule of law were at stake, and would be 
 imperiled if Hitler got the bomb first.  In this sense, the nuclear weapons 
 program of the US was very much part of the immigrant input into American 
 society.  Oppenheimer was of Jewish immigrant origins and believed that the 
 future of the Jewish race was involved in the project:  That was why he built 
 the first A-Bomb.  It was equally true that Dr. Edward Teller, of immigrant 
 Hungarian origin, who built the first H-Bomb, was convinced that by doing so 
 he was protecting American freedom from the Stalinist totalitarian system 
 which had engulfed the country of his forebears.  Fear, altruism, the desire to 
 ‘make the world safe for democracy,’ as much as capitalist method, drove 
 forward the effort.  Nuclear weapons were thus the product of American 
 morality as well as of its productive skill. (p. 784) 
  Brinkley metaphorically calls the A-bomb a “democratic bomb,” which was 
“spurred on by genuine idealism” (p. 784).  He also writes that those involved with 
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the project were motivated by a threat to “...liberty and decency, the right of self-
government, independence, and the international rule of law...” (p. 785) the 
implication being that these were taken by those involved in the Manhattan project, to 
be virtues of a democratic society.  Further, Brinkley cites the motivations for the 
Manhattan Project as being directly tied to their context.  Oppenheimer, he claims, 
“was of Jewish immigrant origins and believed that the future of the Jewish race was 
involved in the project:  That was why he built the first A-Bomb” (p. 785) and he then 
claims that Teller was similarly motivated by his Hungarian roots.  He argues “[f]ear, 
altruism, the desire to ‘make the world safe for democracy,’ as much as capitalist 
method, drove forward the effort” (786).  Brinkley’s statement that particular virtues 
or vices were appropriate or inappropriate given the particular time or context places 
these statements in the category of virtue ethics statements rather than another 
category, such as categorical issues which are more universal.  I will give an 
overview of categorical moral statements in the following section. 
Categorical Statements. Categorical moral statements aim to analyze history 
through the use of universal claims about morality.  This category of statement is not 
offered with consideration for time, consequences or context.  For a moral statement 
to count as being categorical, it must be at the very least 1) universal in nature, and 2) 
made without regard to the consequences of the particular action or event. 
Categorical moral statements are most commonly associated with the work of 
Immanuel Kant, and in particular with Kant’s central work on this topic was 
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) which dictated that moral 
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statements ought to be made with regard to duty or obligation and not with regard to 
consequences.  These statements are also sometimes called deontological statements. 
Kant’s primary contribution to deontological ethics may be the categorical 
imperative, which has three iterations, the most famous of which is, “Act only 
according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should 
become a universal law” (Kant, 1785/2002, p. 283).  This imperative was at the center 
of Kant’s moral philosophy.   
In Kant’s view, human morality is tied to rationality, and, he argued, what is 
right is what rational people do, and so the categorical imperative is an imperative 
that is universally and objectively to be upheld.  Duties and obligations, to Kant, were 
not tied to particular contexts and remained duties and obligations regardless of their 
consequences.  Categorical statements, then, are those statements that dictate that an 
action is right or wrong regardless of its context or consequences. 
Zinn (2003) included many of this kind of statement in his People’s History of 
the United States.  One such example includes the following statement, made about 
the use of the atomic bomb and addressing the question of whether members of the 
American government had known about the bombing before it took place.  
“…Immoral it was, like any bombing- but not really sudden or shocking to the 
American Government” (p. 411).  This example is fairly straightforward.  It is a 
categorical statement because it asserts that the use of bombs in Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki were wrong and, further, that every bombing is wrong.  Zinn holds this to 
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be categorically true, and is unlikely to be persuaded by arguments that appeal to the 
consequences of particular bombings.  
 The following example from Canfield (1954) is similarly clear-cut: 
“Roosevelt, like any leader in his position would have, responded to threats to 
security by issuing Executive Order 9066” (p. 632).  In this example, Canfield is 
claiming that Roosevelt was right to endorse Executive Order 9066, and that any 
leader in his position,” likewise, would also have been right.  The language of each of 
these examples makes it fairly clear that they are categorical statements- they appeal 
to objective morality without regard to context or consequence.  
 The following example is also a categorical moral statement, though its 
discourse may not be as straightforward:  
 Some critics of the decision, including some of the scientists involved in the 
Manhattan Project, have argued that whatever the Japanese intentions, the 
United States, as a matter of morality, should not have used the terrible new 
weapon (Brinkley, 1997, p. 771). 
  Brinkley writes that some critics held that the atomic bombs were immoral “as 
a matter of morality” (p. 771).  Further, he dismisses the potential consequences of 
the atomic bombs and the question of whether the use of the atomic bombs was just 
with regard to Japanese intention.  By dismissing such things, he is appealing to a 
universal moral standard that holds consequences to be irrelevant.   
 In contrast to Brinkley, Sayle (1995) makes a categorical statement not about 
actions but about persons.  In an attempt to characterize American perceptions of the 
Japanese, Sayle writes: 
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 But, loathsome as they were, the Japanese were also terrifying, like any 
 madmen ready to die for a cause; reasonable people would never have begun a 
 war like theirs in the first place.  They also seemed to have superhuman 
 courage... Sheltered behind concrete bunkers and barriers of coconut logs, 
 Japanese soldiers worked their machine guns until they died or were burned 
 out by flamethrowers.  They rarely surrendered, and then only in ones or twos, 
 usually wounded.  How, then, short of extermination, could they ever be 
 defeated? (Sayle, 1995, p. 27). 
 In this example, Sayle is claiming that “reasonable people” act in a particular 
way, and do not fight the way that the Japanese did during World War II.  Categorical 
statements may be the most straightforward and easily identifiable in the text.  Along 
with consequentialist moral statements they are also perhaps share the most overlap 
with the way that traditional moral statements are made outside of history textbooks.  
In the following section I will outline consequentialist moral statements. 
Consequentialist Statements.  The most common ethical claims made about 
history are claims that focus on the notion of causality.  The point of analysis for 
some statements is located in the state of the world that is thought to have been 
brought about by a particular action or event.  For a moral statement to be considered 
a consequentialist moral statement it must appeal to the consequences of a particular 
action to justify it. 
Consequentialist moral statements are most closely associated with Jeremy 
Bentham and John Stuart Mill, proponents of the most commonly known 
consequentialist philosophy, utilitarianism.  Mill and Bentham both held the view that 
an act or omission is right if and only if it maximizes particular goods and minimizes 
particular harms.  There are varying views over what these particular goods are, they 
may be happiness (Mill, 1863) or preferences (Singer, 2003) in consequentialist 
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theories that focus on actions.  In contrast, consequentialist theories may hold that 
particular rules (rather than actions) are right because of the generally good 
consequences that they bring about (Hooker, 2002).  
One example of a consequentialist moral statement comes from Bernstein 
(1986), a critic of the atomic bombs who questioned whether the numbers being 
reported by U.S. officials were accurate.  In describing what he called “a post-war 
myth” (p. 131) Bernstein writes: 
The claim of a half million American lives was a post-war creation.  Shortly 
after the Nagasaki bombing, Winston Churchill declared that the atomic 
bombings had saved well over 1,200,000 Allied lives, including about a 
million American lives.  General Leslie Groves, commanding general of the 
wartime atomic bomb project who was proud of the bombings of Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki, suggested that Churchill’s number was “a little high” 
(Bernstein, 1986, p. 131). 
Brinkley (1997) also employed a consequentialist moral statement in defense 
of the use of the atomic bombs.  He wrote, “nothing less could have persuaded the 
Japanese to surrender without a costly American invasion” (p. 771).  In other words, 
he holds that the act of using the atomic bombs against Japan was the cause of 
Japanese surrender.  The implication of Brinkley’s claim is that Japanese surrender 
was a good thing and that bringing it about caused enough good to justify any harm 
that it also caused. Eibling (1964) makes a similar claim: 
 Then, on August 6, 1945, the United States dropped an atomic bomb on the 
 industrial city of Hiroshima.  The city was almost annihilated.  Nearly 80,000 
 of its people were killed outright.  Thousands more were burned or injured in 
 other ways.  This terrible weapon was used so that an invasion of Japan, 
 which might have cost hundreds of thousands of lives, would be
 unnecessary (p.342). 
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 He explains the terrible harm, including the “nearly 80,000” people who were 
“killed outright,” by the use of the atomic bombs and then considers the “hundreds of 
thousands of lives” that may have been lost if the bomb had not been used and an 
invasion of Japan had become necessary.  Ultimately, he concludes that the use of the 
bombs was justified given the consequences that an omission may have brought 
about.  
 Messer (1985) offers a strikingly clear example of a consequentialist 
statement about the use of the atomic bomb in which he outlines the number related 
to the use of the atomic bombs and explains that these numbers led Truman to justify 
his decision to use the bombs.  He writes: 
 In announcing the bombings the President had said that they were carried out 
 in order to ‘shorten the agony of war’ and save ‘thousands and thousands of 
 American lives.’ Later he would be more specific, citing the estimated 
 250,000 Allied casualties in a prolonged war.  These ranged from 500,000 to 5 
 million.  Official U.S. estimate of Japanese killed in the atomic attacks totaled 
 about 110,000.  Thus, in saving more lives than they took, the atomic 
 bombings were justified as the lesser of two evils.  After the war Truman said 
 that he had been told that the population of the target cities was about 60,000.  
 Hiroshima’s population was in fact more than 350,000 and Nagasaki’s about 
 280,000.  Of these, nearly 200,000 were killed and 150,000 injured.  At the 
 time few could argue with such logic (Messer, 1985, p. 91). 
 Consequentialist moral statements share one particular thing in common with 
each of the other kinds of moral statement that I have outlined so far.  Each looked to 
the actions and events of history and made statements about them from their own 
vantage point.  A very different discussion about ethics might take place if we allow 
the use of hindsight.  In the following section I will discuss the final kind of moral 
statement identified in my analysis of history textbooks, hindsight statements.   
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Hindsight Statements.  Statements with the benefit of historical distance, we 
might claim, allow us more insight in to the actual state of affairs at the time. These 
moral statements take a “god’s eye view” of the action or event, utilizing the 
knowledge we now have about the state of affairs at the time of the action or event.  
This might include a reflection on what can now be known to have been going on 
concurrently, or knowledge about the intentions of other parties involved in a 
particular conflict.  Johnson (1997) used hindsight in his appraisal of the Japanese-
American internment in the following statement: 
 Predictably, this racial animosity soon extended to Americans of Japanese 
 decent.  There were not many Japanese Americans in the United States- only 
 about 127,000, most of them concentrated in a few areas of California.  About 
 a third of them were unnaturalized, first-generation immigrants (Issei); 
 two-thirds were naturalized or native-born citizens of the United States 
 (Nisei).  Because they generally kept to themselves and preserved traditional 
 Japanese cultural patterns, it was possible for others to imagine that the 
 Japanese Americans were engaged in conspiracies on behalf of their 
 homeland (There is no evidence to suggest that they actually were.).  The 
 public pressure to remove the ‘threat’ grew steadily (p. 763). 
 Johnson is giving what appears to be a strictly historical account.  Even the 
moral statement, which is seen in the parenthetical, appears at first to be a historical 
statement.  The example takes a moral turn, however, if we consider how college 
students reading textbooks might interpret this.  
  Johnson’s (1997) parenthetical about the lack of evidence suggesting that 
Japanese-Americans were “engaged in conspiracies on behalf of their homeland” 
implies that the act of interning Japanese-American citizens is wrong based on the 
knowledge we now have about the intentions and plans of citizens at the time.   It 
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leaves open whether the internment was morally permissible based on the knowledge 
at the time, thus making it a moral, rather than strictly historical statement.  Moral 
statements in history texts hold the potential for various types of engagement and 
discussion. Students could be expected to engage, for example, in debates about 
whether there is or isn’t evidence, whether warrant for the moral statements could 
come from hindsight, and so on.   
Rawls (1995) also makes use of hindsight in the following moral statement:   
 Truman was in many ways a good, at times a very good president.  But the 
 way he ended the war showed he failed as a statesman.  For him it was an 
 opportunity missed, and a loss to the country and its armed forces as well.  It 
 is sometimes said that questioning the bombing of Hiroshima is an insult to 
 the American troops who fought the war.  This is hard to understand.  We 
 should be able to look back and consider our faults after fifty years.  We 
 expect the Germans and the Japanese to do that... why shouldn’t we?  It can’t 
 be that we think we waged the war without moral error (Rawls, 1995, p. 478). 
Alperovitz (1995) uses the type of hindsight that Rawls calls for when he writes:   
“Ask the average person why the United States exploded the atomic bomb 
over Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the answer will almost always be 
straightforward: ‘to save thousands of lives by making an invasion 
unnecessary at the end of World War II....’ The only problem with this 
morally comforting explanation is that it is now known to be false 
(Alperovitz, 1995, p. 5). 
 Alperovitz is making clear use of hindsight in this case by claiming that 
historical evidence has made it difficult to use common justifications for the atomic 
bomb. 
 Messer (1985) discusses this use of hindsight statement by commenting on 
President Truman’s feelings toward it: 
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Sharing this concern about how future historians might judge the bomb 
decision, Truman lent his full support... after retiring to private life he 
repeated- in private interviews, public statements, and his two-volume 
memoirs- that he had always regarded the bomb strictly as a weapon and had 
no doubt or regret, either at the time or in retrospect, about the necessity or 
wisdom if its use against Japan.  Any speculation about how things might 
have  been done differently was based upon hindsight.  Truman frequently 
cut off  any further discussion of the subject with the observation that ‘any 
schoolboy’s afterthought is worth more than al the generals’ forethought.’ 
(Messer, 1985, p. 92). 
 Hindsight statements are the final type of moral statement that I identified in 
my analysis of history textbooks.  While Messer’s explanation of Truman’s stance on 
the atomic bombs is not a moral statement in its own right, it does illustrate how 
complex hindsight statements and other types of moral statements in history are.  In 
the following section I will discuss how this theory of statements illustrates the 
problem that I identified in chapter two of my dissertation.  In this study I analyzed 
two cases that were covered in a total of 16 textbooks.   Below, are two tables that 
outline the moral statements found in my study.  These tables are not meant to 
provide a comprehensive overview of the moral statements that I found in historical 
writing, but rather to offer an overview of the number of judgments that were made 
about each event and during each time period.  In analysis section that follows the 
tables I will discuss the findings further by contrasting the statements that were made 
about the internment with those made about the use of the atomic bombs and then by 
comparing the statements that were made across the various time periods.  These 
comparisons are useful in understanding the implications of historical writing and the 
ways in which it changes and frames our understanding of particular events. 
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Table 7: Analysis of Ethical Claims about the Japanese American Internment 
Time 
Period 
Teleological Experiments 
in Living 
Conseque
ntialist 
Virtue Hindsight Categorical  Claims  
sympathetic 
to the  
Japanese 
Post 
World 
War II 
1 5 7 0 1 2 1 
Vietnam 
Era 
2 2 1 0 1 0 0 
Post-
Vietnam 
8 4 15 5 2 4 14 
Post 9/11 3 7 10 4 9 17 16 
 
Table 6: Analysis of Ethical Claims about the Bombings of Japan 
Time Period Teleological Experiments in 
Living 
Consequenti
alist 
 
Virtue  Hindsight Categorical  Claims 
Sympathetic to 
the Japanese 
Post World 
War II 
12 4 34 20 3 24 30 
Vietnam Era 5 2 31 22 9 45 31 
Post-Vietnam 13 7 17 11 16 31 11 
Post 9/11 11 4 19 14 8 17 26 
 
 
Presentation of Historical Material Between Events and Across Eras 
 Although U.S. textbooks cover both the use of atomic bombs over Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki and the relocation of Japanese-Americans from the west coast to 
internment camps during World War II, there are striking differences in the treatment 
of each event.  Many of these differences change or become more apparent depending 
on the time period in which they were written, but there are a few differences in the 
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inclusion of the two events that seem universal across these time periods.   The most 
noticeable difference was the variance in the coverage given to each event.   
 The use of the atomic bombs had a dramatic impact on U.S. history and this is 
made clear by the exhaustive treatment of the bombs that is given in all of the 
textbooks included in the study, across each of the time periods.  In contrast, the 
coverage of the Japanese-American Internment was inconsistent.  Some textbooks 
covered the internment extensively while others gave it no more than a description of 
a sentence or two.   Nine of the sixteen textbooks included in this study made no 
mention of the internment at all.
8
  My particular study focused on the analysis of 
specific moral statements made and the relationship of knowledge to these claims, so 
I was unable to give adequate attention to the exclusion of events or detailed coverage 
of events, but others who have engaged in text analysis have also recognized this kind 
of exclusion.
9
  The degree of coverage given to each particular event is critical to 
understanding the implications of moral statements in historical writing because it 
paints a clearer picture of the kind of information being articulated or implied in 
historical writing.  If an event is not covered in a given text then the implication is 
that it is not worth coverage.   
 There are other key differences between the coverage of the atomic bombs 
and the coverage of the Japanese-American internment.  The U.S. is typically the 
focus of the sections on the atomic bombs.  Whether the author is expressing support 
                                                 
8
 Interestingly, of the nine texts that excluded coverage of the internment, eight were 
published between 1958 and 1972.  None of the Vietnam Era texts included coverage of the 
internment.   
9
 Romanowski (2009), for example,  noticed omissions of the invasion of Afghanistan and 
attacks on Islamic groups in the wake of September 11th, 2001. 
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or disdain for president Truman’s decision to drop the atomic bombs it seems that the 
focus of such sections tend to be on the agony that went along with the U.S. decision 
to use atomic force.  The dramatic impact of the atomic bombs on American morale is 
made clear across each of the historical time periods represented by the textbooks in 
this study.  As tables 5 and 6 show, until September 11th, hindsight statements were 
used far more frequently in the coverage of the atomic bombs than in the coverage of 
the internment.  Across time periods, authors seem much more conflicted about the 
moral status of the atomic bombs while coverage of the internment showed clear 
changes in the moral tide as authors first took for granted that it was justified, then 
stopped talking about it, and then began to claim that it was unjustified.  The use of 
hindsight statements reflects this because often they are employed when authors are 
raising questions about the moral status of a particular event given what is now 
known about the event and the actual state of affairs at the time.  For example, in 
sections that cover Hiroshima and Nagasaki authors might mention what the U.S. 
believed about, for example, Japanese surrender, the population of Hiroshima, and so 
on and then compare these beliefs to evidence about the actual population of 
Hiroshima and the state of the Japanese military at the time to discuss whether the 
bombings were necessary and justified.   
 In contrast, it wasn’t until post-September 11th that authors began to make 
similar claims about the Japanese-American internment.  One author (Caroll, 2002) 
makes a hindsight statement and mentions the lack of evidence that Japanese-
American citizens were engaging in espionage while living in the United States and 
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the eventual apology that was offered by the U.S. government to the families of those 
citizens who were relocated. This kind of statement is only recently seen in the 
literature on the internment, however, and earlier authors took for granted that the 
internment was necessary and justified if they mentioned it at all. 
 A final noticeable difference between the coverage of the two events is the 
level of sympathy expressed for the Japanese in the wake of the bombings or the 
internment.  As illustrated in the table above, sympathy for the Japanese-Americans 
sent to relocation camps has remained relatively the same across the historical 
periods.  The number of claims sympathetic to the Japanese has increased but the 
depth of coverage about the internment has also increased and so the percentage of 
the overall coverage of the internment that is sympathetic to the Japanese has 
remained relatively stagnant.   
 In contrast, percentage of statements made about the atomic bombings that are 
sympathetic to the Japanese has not been as stable across the historical periods.  
During the Post-World War II, Vietnam, and Post-9/11 eras the statements made that 
were sympathetic to the Japanese were a just less than half of all of the statements 
made.  During the Post-Vietnam era, however, the number of sympathetic statements 
made dropped dramatically.  It’s not clear whether this drop was a function of the 
political climate of the time or some other factor but it is evident that there was a 
change in the way that Americans viewed Japanese victims of the atomic bombings at 
the time.  I discuss implications for using historical writing in the classroom in 
chapter five, but this unexplained change and others like it undoubtedly raise 
85 
 
questions about the use of history texts.  For example, how do the students taught 
with Post-Vietnam era texts compare to those taught with texts from the other 
historical periods with regard to their views of the moral status of the atomic bombs?  
Further, it would be prudent to ask how these variant views of the victims of the 
bombing shape and inform a society’s understanding of the bombings.  How, for 
example, might different views of the morality of the atomic bombs also influence 
positions and policies on different contemporary foreign conflicts?   I address these 
questions in more detail in chapter five. 
 There are also differences between the ways that sympathetic statements about 
the internment are presented in contrast to sympathetic statements about the atomic 
bombs.  The majority of statements in historical writing that were sympathetic to the 
survivors of the atomic bombs were matter of fact, and presented these victims as 
civilians who were unfortunately caught between the bombs and a government who 
believed themselves to be a divine power.  A very distant and undetailed portrait of 
the victims is painted.  The following example from Todd and Curti (1966) is 
representative of the kind of claims that are made about the atomic bombs: 
 On 6 August 1945, at eight-fifteen in the morning, a solitary plane crossed 
 over the Japanese city of Hiroshima.  It flew very high.  A few people looked 
 up.  No alarm was sounded.  Then, suddenly, the city disintegrated in a single 
 searing atomic blast.  Nearly 100,000 of the 245,000 men, women, and 
 children in Hiroshima were killed instantly or died soon after.  Thousands of 
 others suffered dreadful after-effects.  A few days later, a second bomb fell on 
 Nagasaki, another Japanese city.  A new force had been added to warfare, a 
 force that would enormously complicate relations among nations in post-war 
 years (1966, p. 739). 
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 In contrast, statements that are sympathetic to the victims of the internment 
are, for the most part, more detailed and less detached.  While descriptions of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki mention “men, women, and children” without much detail 
or description, statements that are sympathetic to the victims of the Japanese-
American internment paint a more personal picture: 
 The surprise Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in Hawaii had stunned the 
 nation. After the bombing, panic-stricken citizens feared that the Japanese 
 would soon attack the United States. Frightened citizens believed false rumors 
 that Japanese Americans were committing sabotage by mining coastal harbors 
 and poisoning vegetables (Danzer, 2003, p. 594). 
 
 Danzer’s reference to the internment offers greater detail about the particular 
fears that spurred the call for relocation of Japanese-Americans from the west coast.    
This reference is also characteristic of the level of detail that was included in many of 
the statements made about the internment in the data set used for this study.   
 In addition to noticeable differences between the statements made in historical 
writing about the atomic bombs and statements made in historical writing about the 
internment, there were also very apparent differences between the historical time 
periods in terms of the number and kind of moral statements that were made during 
each.  One of the most apparent differences between time periods is the level of 
description given about each event and about conflict between the U.S. and Japan 
more generally.   
 The presentation of the material was one way in which the texts changed over 
historical time periods.  On the whole, texts from the post-world war II era and the 
Vietnam era presented their ideas in a very matter of fact way, outlining the nature of 
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the various events that amounted to the conflict between Japan and the U.S., and 
presenting the Japanese as a people on a mission to conquer neighboring lands in the 
name of a divine emperor.  The texts from these historical periods can be 
characterized by attempts to present only the facts, and little detail about the events 
was offered.  In fact, the internment was excluded entirely from Vietnam era texts.  In 
contrast, during the post-Vietnam era explicit moral statements and bolder 
speculation was more common.  The following extracts from textbooks illustrate this 
difference.  The first, a quote from Blum (1963) illustrates the descriptive nature of 
claims made during the earlier two eras.  Blum, in this case, is describing the thoughts 
and opinions of critics rather than making a moral statement of his own.  This kind of 
description is characteristic of the statements made during this time period: 
On the other hand, thoughtful observers have wondered whether the American 
government, with Japan essentially beaten and on the verge of capitulation, had 
exhausted all possible alternatives before at last having recourse to drop the 
bomb- whether there was not evidence of negotiation or demonstration that 
those have first been attempted, with the bomb laced in reserve as a weapon of 
last resort (Blum, 1963, p. unknown). 
In contrast, statements made during the post-Vietnam era are much bolder in 
their statements.  For example, Sayle (1995) writes: 
 But, loathsome as they were, the Japanese were also terrifying, like any 
 madmen ready to die for a cause; reasonable people would never have begun a 
 war like theirs in the first place (Sayle, 1995, p. 27). 
This passage seems much more straightforwardly a moral statement, and not a re-
telling of someone else’s account.  Post-9/11 historical writing is more critical still.  
In addition to offering much more detail about Japanese culture before World War 
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II,
10
 moral statements in texts from this historical time period were less speculative 
and more definitively critical: 
 All the camps were located in desolate areas. Families lived in wooden  
 barracks covered with tar paper, in rooms equipped only with cots, blankets, 
 and light bulbs. People had to share toilet, bathing, and dining facilities. 
 Barbed wire surrounded the camps, and armed guards patrolled the grounds. 
 Although the government referred to these as relocation camps, they were 
 concentration camps” (Cayton, 2003, p. 858). 
 There were also significant differences in the way that specific content was 
presented across historical time periods.  For example, during the post world-war II, 
Vietnam, and post-Vietnam eras the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were 
presented most often as one event or in one section.  For example, Todd (1977) 
writes: 
 [T]he face of war is the face of death; death is an inevitable part of any order 
 the wartime leader gives... war in the twentieth century has grown barbarous, 
 more destructive, more debased in all its aspects.  Now, with the release of 
 atomic energy, man’s ability to destroy himself is nearly complete.  The 
 bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki ended a war.  They also made it 
 wholly clear that we must never have a war.  This is the lesson men and 
 leaders everywhere must learn, and I believe that when they learn it they will 
 find a way to lasting peace (Todd, 1977, p. 738). 
Many post 9/11 Textbooks, on the other hand, presented Nagasaki and Hiroshima as 
separate but related events.  Textbook headings often used the names of both cities 
rather than using headings such as “The Atomic Bombs.”11 
 There are other differences between the treatment of particular content across 
time periods as well as changes in methodology and presentation.  Contemporary 
                                                 
10
 Including, for example, detail about the 1922 ban on immigration from Japan and 
photographs of Japanese “picture brides” from the early 1900’s (Ogawa 2005) 
11
 This heading was used in Canfield, 1954. 
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texts, for example, included many more narratives of those who experienced the 
events. There are also differences between the ways that each event was presented, 
regardless of the historical time period. Each example of the ways that historical 
writing differs from text to text, era to era, raises important questions about the use of 
historical writing as a teaching tool.  I will discuss the implications of these questions 
and examples in chapter five and will also discuss how history pedagogy might take 
these moral statements in to account, and what strategies might help students 
critically address moral statements in historical writing.
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CHAPTER FIVE: “HOW GOOD A HISTORIAN SHALL I BE?” 
 
 Few other events have influenced recent U.S. History as much as President 
Truman’s decision to use the atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  The use of 
nuclear weapons against Japan showed the world that the U.S. was capable of mass 
destruction and raised questions about how history would tell the story of the bombs 
in the post-war world.   Would history portray Truman’s crisis of conscience over the 
decision to use nuclear force?  The agony that Albert Einstein felt over hearing about 
the destruction in Hiroshima?  How would historians’ accounts of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki compare to their accounts of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor? 
 The relocation of Japanese-American citizens from the west coast raised 
similar questions about how historians would negotiate the ethical issues connected 
with the relations between the U.S. and Japan in their narratives about World War II.  
Nicholls (2006) showed that there are significant differences between the way that 
Japanese and the U.S. textbooks portray the conflict between the two during the 
Second World War.  He wrote, “[E]vidence suggests that perhaps the biggest 
influence on textbook perspectives of the past are the current political agendas of 
nations here in the present, portrayals of the Second World War reflecting current 
political concerns” (p. 40). 
 Nicholls’ observations are consistent with the findings of my own study.  
There were significant differences between the coverage of the internment and atomic 
bombs across historical time periods which reflected the political struggles and tide of 
each.  The military struggles that the U.S. was engaged in during each of these 
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historical time periods defined the moral and political outlook of the nation.  In 
essence, the U.S. was a very different nation during each era. An examination of the 
differences between the portrayals of historical events across time periods make it 
clear that history is not about straightforwardly factual claims, and that a great deal of 
the work involved in the teaching of history is or should be critically engaging the 
various narratives and sources that present historical events. 
In a discussion over the nature of history education, R.G. Collingwood wrote:  
 
  When we think of history as merely a trade or profession, a craft or calling, we 
 find it hard to justify our existence as historians.  What can the historian do for 
 people except turn them in to historians like himself?  And what is the good of 
 doing that?  It is not simply a vicious circle, whose tendency is to overcrowd 
 the ranks of the profession and to produce an underpaid ‘intellectual 
 proletariat’ of sweated teachers.  This may be a valid argument against the 
 multiplication of historians, if history is merely a profession, but it cannot be 
 if history is a universal human interest; for in that case there are already as 
 many historians as there are human beings, and the question is not ‘Shall I be 
 a historian or not?’ but “How good a historian shall I be?’ (Collingwood, 
 1930, pg. 3) 
 
 If history is, as Collingwood claimed, “a universal human interest,” then the 
differences between the moral statements found in historical writing ought to give us 
pause for thought.  How should history teachers negotiate and make use of such 
different types of moral statements or of the existence of ethical commentary in 
historical writing at all.    The two historical cases that I analyzed in this dissertation 
provide rich examples of how epistemology and ethics intersect in historical inquiry.  
The historian’s task in determining a research project may not be as simple as it 
seems. He or she must consider the type of research question that is appropriate to 
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ask, not only given the context of the research program that he or she is a part of, but 
also in light of the various ethical consequences of that question.   
 Of course, if history is of universal human interest then engaging in historical 
writing is also a process of determining what history students know about the past by 
way of deciding what events and perspectives are included or excluded from each 
historian’s telling of history.  In addition to determining which events are included or 
excluded from historical writing, the way in which events and perspectives are 
included or excluded also influences what students will know and think about 
historical events.  For example in 1950 students would have been using textbooks that 
included some coverage of the Japanese-American internment and would have been 
discussing the internment at a time when the Emergency Detention Act of 1950 was 
being passed by the supreme court.  This act mandated that the government refurbish 
many of the detention camps used to hold Japanese-Americans less than a decade 
earlier in order to detain “persons for whom there were reasonable grounds to believe 
would commit or conspire to commit espionage or sabotage” should the president 
declare an “Internal State of Emergency” (Daniels, 2005, p. 165).   
 Would the relevance of internment to the political struggle of the Cold War 
prompt justification of the Japanese-American internment?  Or, given that the 1950 
act mandated trials for anyone imprisoned in a camp would the Japanese-American 
internment be viewed as primitive and barbaric in classroom discussions?  Within 
eight years of the Emergency Detention Act of 1950 coverage of the Japanese-
American internment would vanish from textbooks altogether.  It is nearly impossible 
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to believe that the internment could have been taught without any consideration of 
morality and value.  Likewise, it seems impossible that concerns over terrorism, racial 
and ethnic profiling, and the conflict in the middle-east can be entirely separated from 
textbook coverage and classroom discussion of the internment in the post-9/11 world. 
 The role of theory, testing of hypotheses, and selection of evidence are also 
key examples of the centrality of epistemology to making ethical claims in the 
teaching and writing of history.  The use of nuclear weapons in Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki is often cited as necessary in order to prevent U.S. bombings that were 
planned for other Japanese cities in August, October, and November 1945 and would 
potentially result in 1,000,000 civilian casualties, not to mention the U.S. troops that 
might be lost in the Pacific before the bombings occurred (Walker, 1990 and Brook, 
1968).  The atomic bombs contributed, at least in part, to the Japanese surrender and 
the end of World War II, proponents of this view argue.  Critics of this view claim 
that Japanese surrender was inevitable, and that the bombing of Nagasaki was 
unnecessary and morally questionable.   
 This example illustrates the kinds of epistemological issues that are raised 
when a historical topic is highly value-laden.  Levisohn (2010) points out that 
ideological bias inevitably shapes historical narratives and historical knowledge.  He 
writes:  
 The central problem is the way that those biases seem to give rise to multiple 
 possible accounts of the same historical events.  For a conscientious historian 
 and for conscientious history educators—this problem is both epistemological 
 and practical. How should we tell stories about the past? How should we teach 
 those stories? (Levisohn, 2010, pp. 1-2). 
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 This problem is evident in historical writing.  Discipline-specific standards of 
evidence, coherence, and argumentation still result in inconsistent portrayals of 
historical events.  Levisohn argues “the question of which narrative we should teach 
would seem to be dependent (at least in part) on the question of which narrative is 
true” (p. 2) and this seems to be a common-sense solution to a problem of competing 
narratives.  The trouble is that it is nearly impossible to determine which narrative is 
true, particularly when morality is central to the issue at hand.   Are textbooks that 
portray the atomic bombings as nothing more than an unethical show of power on the 
part of the United States correct in maligning President Truman, or are less critical 
texts correct in making utilitarian arguments to justify the bombings with arguments 
about the amount of potential casualties staved off by Japanese surrender? 
 Identifying the types of moral statements used in historical writing is an 
important step toward critically engaging with historical writing in the classroom.   
Good historical inquiry, as Collingwood (1930) claimed, does not stop at presenting 
historical events in truthful ways, and includes historiographical processes such as the 
evaluation of evidence, analysis of claims, and scrutiny of various accounts.  
 Identifying the types of moral statements made in historical writing satisfies 
two aims.  First, the existence of moral statements serves as a reminder that critical 
engagement with history is necessary.  Second, it serves as a starting point for 
historiographical inquiry because it provides categories of statement to look for in 
history texts and to discuss in history classes.  In the following section I will explore 
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how an analysis of moral statements in historical writing warrants a call for a pluralist 
approach to history education. 
Teaching History, Talking Morality 
 Identifying and analyzing moral statements in historical writing serves two 
purposes:  First, it provides the impetus for critical discussion of multiple 
perspectives and moral issues in the history classroom.  Second, the categories that I 
have established in this dissertation provide a starting point for these discussions by 
giving educators and students statement-types that are identified and thereby more 
easily recognized in reading and discussion.  Accounting for and outlining the 
differences between eras also provides stimulus for critically engaging with historical 
material because it implies that the historical writing that is being used in today’s 
history courses will be similarly reflective of our own political biases and cultural 
trends. Essentially, today’s historical writing amounts to an independent, less-than-
objective perspective of its own, an idea that is rarely considered in history education 
(Nicholls 2006).  Being aware of the differences in historical narratives over time is 
also a reminder of how our own moral and political biases are reflected in historical 
writing today. 
 As an impetus, this study should serve to unsettle traditional teaching methods 
and beliefs that as a discipline history works with facts of the matter and 
straightforwardly objective accounts.  It also should serve as motivation to ask how 
disagreement or different perspectives ought to be used in the history classroom.  
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What is the significance of these different perspectives and of the variation among 
and between historical narratives?  Nicholls (2006) argues: 
  The significance of textbook perspectives cannot be understood outside of the 
 context in which students engage with them.  Likewise, if students are 
 encouraged to grapple with perspectives within a framework that is sensitive 
 to cultural differences then, perhaps, there would be less reason for concern.  
 Critical engagement stands in contrast to the memorization of a single 
 perspective.  Equally, it requires students to evaluate, to assess, and to make 
 tentative judgments, refuting the idea that al differences are simply relative 
 (pp. 52-53). 
In other words, the very fact that differences of perspective and differences of opinion 
exist over historical events and are documented in historical writing ought to drive a 
critical engagement with the material presented in the classroom.   
 Identifying types of moral statements should not only motivate critical 
engagement with historical writing, this identification also serves as a resource or 
starting point for a more historiographical approach to doing history.  Levisohn 
(2009) explains: students of history, whether professional 
 Students of history whether professional historians or relative novices, are always 
 dealing with events that are already narrativised by others. Typically, in fact, 
 the events in question are over-narrativised; the story has been told many 
 times, in many ways,  implicitly and explicitly, by those close to the event and 
 by others more distant from it. The constructive work of the historical 
 inquirer, then—the creation of historical narratives—is always a product of a 
 negotiation among multiple narratives, both ‘first level’ primary-source 
 narratives and ‘second level’  historiographical narratives. The cognitive 
 activity of the historian [may] be described as that of grappling with other 
 narratives of various sorts and at different levels (p. 11).  
 
The identification of the different types of moral statements, then, offers historians or 
students of history individual points to look for in order to identify differences 
between narratives.  If Levisohn is right, and the “constructive work of the historical 
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inquirer... is always a product of negotiation among multiple narratives” (p. 11), then 
the categories of moral statements function as a way of identifying the different 
narratives and understanding their differences.  Identifying a moral statement as 
consequentialist, for example, makes the aim of the narrative clear in order to 
compare it with other narratives.   
 Professional historians engage in historiography by looking at existing 
narratives, reflecting on the evidence given in support of them, supporting or 
critiquing their methods and arguments.  A similar historiographical approach can be 
taken in the classroom by highlighting moral statements within one textbook and 
allowing students to engage critically with them and then with the arguments and 
objections that they create in discussion with one another and as a class.   
 But why moral statements rather than straightforwardly historical claims?  
The answer to this question is not easy.  Debates in the philosophy of history leave 
the question of whether we can really learn about morality by looking to the past 
unsettled and unanswered.  To simply claim that moral statements ought to somehow 
take priority over historical claims because this will teach us how to act morally 
would be naive.  Rather, moral statements are well-suited to this sort of critical 
engagement or historiographical approach because so many of the allusions that we 
see made to history outside of the classroom are allusions to morality.  Questions of 
historical apology, debts, and revenge are all references to morality in some way.  
Therefore, engaging students by looking at the sort of statements- moral statements- 
that are relevant to their world is a commonsense way to involve them in meaningful 
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inquiry.  For example, if students are using social networks to make comments about 
the ethics of Pearl Harbor, then using moral questions as a stimulus for historical 
inquiry about Pearl Harbor is a way to engage interests that students already have, 
and having a guide for identifying moral statements can aide in this inquiry. 
 Another difficult question to address is the issue of what the ultimate aim of 
such critical engagement is.  Should students be encouraged to be aware of moral 
statements in order to navigate around them in pursuit of consensus?  In the following 
section I suggest a method of pluralism for history education that is based on 
Nicholas Rescher’s pluralism.   This method would put consensus aside as the aim for 
history education and focus instead on putting the plural narratives and perspectives 
to work toward a more critical understanding of and engagement with history. 
Pluralism:  A Theoretical Overview 
 Some scholars such as Novick (1998) are eager for historians to come to some 
kind of consensus in their portrayal of historical events, but is this sort of aim a 
realistic one?  Rescher (1993) outlines three notions of consensus about matters of 
fact:   
1. De facto consensus as present here and now in the community (‘of all’ or 
‘of the knowledgeable experts’). 
2. Ultimate consensus as it will (presumably) come to exist in the 
community, in the eventual future (‘in the long run’). 
3. Idealized consensus as a hypothetical eventuation that would be reached 
under ideal (though doubtless never actually realizable) conditions. 
(Rescher, 1993, p. 28) 
 
 Rescher claims that consensus is an unrealistic goal for matters of fact, value, 
or action.  He argues that valid disagreement can actually be both useful and 
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productive.  A similar model of pluralism is useful in history education as a way of 
making the different perspectives and narratives offered in historical writing useful 
and significant components of teaching about history. Built primarily on the idealism 
of R.G. Collingwood (1940), the critical pedagogy of Joe Kincheloe (2003) and the 
pluralism of Nicholas Rescher (1993), pluralism is the view that the present’s 
relationship to the past as one of critical engagement.  Historical truth, from this view, 
is multi-faceted and comes from plural perspectives, and is concerned with matters of 
value. Most central to this view, however, is the belief that plural views are not only 
necessary, but also inevitable, in gaining a complete understanding of the world. 
 Pluralism, like consensus-reliant theories, has a great deal of gradation.  
Aristotle (350 BCE/2009), for example, believed that there was objective scientific 
knowledge (episteme), which relied on empirical demonstration and was focused on 
the object of study, which was not prone to change.  Episteme was contrasted to 
consensus-reliant epistemic beliefs that Aristotle claimed were sufficient to navigate 
the social world.  Consensus was sufficient for everyday matters, but scientific 
knowledge was of a different sort.  Rescher (1993) describes this distinction in 
Aristotle’s work: 
 Consensus thus provides a validation for claims-albeit not by way of their 
 authentication as genuinely scientific knowledge (episteme), but by way of 
 their substantiation as cognitively appropriate belief (pistis).  In this way, 
 premises adequate for the inferences and reasoning’s of everyday life 
 situations become available through a consensus of informed people (either 
 everyone, or the appropriate experts or, at least, the majority of people).  In 
 this way, as Aristotle saw it, consensus enjoys an important albeit subordinate 
 status in the epistemic scheme of things- a status which, although not one of 
 ultimate authority, is at least one of substantial weight.” (Rescher, 1993, p. 
 21) 
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 In chapter two I introduced objections to the idea of making moral statements 
in historical writing and about history, offered by Bernard Williams and R.G. 
Collingwood.  Collingwood (1956) argued that moral statements had no place in 
historical inquiry, while Williams (1985) claimed that it was impossible (or nearly so) 
to make moral statements about historical practices.  Pluralism seems to offer a 
practical response to both of these objections.  To Collingwood, Rescher might claim 
that moral judgments are “inevitable” based on differences “in the times, societies, 
and circumstances” (Rescher, 1993, p. 77).  In reply to Williams, Rescher might 
respond that there is some pragmatic value to making moral statements about  past 
practices and events in teaching about history even if there is little certainty that we 
can come to any kind of objective conclusion about the moral permissibility of the 
practices and events that are being taught.  Rescher would likely even claim that 
disagreement over moral statements in history can be productive and useful.   
 Rescher (1993) argues that pluralism is a more realistic and livable method of 
research and inquiry than methods which facilitate and aim for theoretical/cognitive 
consensus.  He argues that the difference between the consensualist and the pluralist 
is as follows: 
1. The consensualist:  ‘Do whatever is needed to avert discord.  Always and 
everywhere work for consensus.’ 
2. The Pluralist:  ‘Accept the inevitability of dissensus in a complex and 
imperfect world.  Strive to make the world safe for disagreement.  Work to 
realize processes and procedures that make dissensus tolerable if not 
actually productive.  (Rescher, 1993, p. 5) 
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 Rescher and other pluralists (Benhabib, 2006) argue that cognitive consensus, 
in fact, can actually be counterproductive to the production of knowledge, because it 
allows people to believe that, in fact, consensus demarks truth when, in reality, 
researchers can come to consensus over a proposition that is not true and may actually 
be biased or misleading.  In a way, the idea that rationality and consensus lead to true 
belief allow for less critical examination of claims that are made within projects of 
research.   
  Rescher (1993) describes four aims for pluralism: “(1) Legitimate diversity; 
(2) restrained dissonance; (3) acquiescence in difference, and (4) respect for the 
autonomy of others” (pg. 3).  Rescher’s condition, that diversity is legitimized, is 
crucial to a plural notion of history.  The social system must work to make society 
safe for difference.  Society can not simply consider different points of views and 
ways of living; it has to restructure itself in a way that this consideration is embedded.  
Rescher argues that, “A sensibly managed social system should be so designed that a 
general harmony of constructive interaction can prevail despite diversity, dissensus, 
and dissonance among individuals and groups- that differences can be accommodated 
short of conflict” (Rescher, 1993, pp. 3).  But, he claims, this requires that “people 
can and should, to everyone’s benefit, accept and come to terms with the idea-and the 
fact- that others will differ from themselves in opinion, in evaluation, and in customs 
and modes of action.”  This understanding of pluralism, that its acceptance is for 
“everyone’s benefit,” makes clear why the consideration of epistemology is key for a 
pluralist framework.  
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 The rational and productive reaction to dissensus is not so much that we 
 ‘tolerate’ others as that we respect their autonomy- that we concede their right 
 to go their own variant way within the framework of such limits as must be 
 imposed in the interests of maintaining that peaceful and productive 
 communal order that is conducive to the best interests of everyone alike. 
 (Rescher, 1993, pp. 3-4). 
It’s not simply enough for variance of opinion and ways of living to be 
acknowledged, it must be deeply considered, and this variance often occurs across 
historical boundaries.  Who is included in this consideration of “to everyone’s 
benefit?”   
 In pluralist contexts, in contrast, there are other objections to overcome.  
Rescher argues that there are two key questions that must be addressed by pluralists:   
(1) How are we to evaluate these positions on our own account?  Are we to 
dismiss those that differ from the one we ourselves favor, or are we to see 
them all as deserving of consideration and some positive response presumably 
stopping short of actual acceptance?  (2) How are we to evaluate the posture 
of those who adopt those variant-positions?  Are we to acknowledge that they 
are (or may be) proceeding in a way that is appropriate and legitimate given 
their situation and circumstances?  These two issues are clearly different and 
distinct.  And even if we are fully committed to the correctness of our position 
in some sphere (the medicine of our own day, for example) we may 
nevertheless acknowledge that other people (the Greeks of Galen’s day, for 
instance) are fully entitled and rationally justified given their situation, in 
holding the views that they do (1993, p. 100).   
   Collingwood’s view of history offers benefits similar to Rescher’s pluralism, 
but also faces the same objections.  Nevertheless, Collingwood’s views are useful in 
constructing a method of pluralism that can deal with both the epistemic and highly 
disputed ethical elements of history.   Collingwood claims that human history is a 
rational process, rather than a process of natural cause-and-effect, and its proper 
subject is the human mind, and human experience.  Because Collingwood’s 
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understanding of what the historian’s interest should be was the study of mental 
processes, his view of history is necessarily at odds with the position that history is 
strictly about facts.  For Collingwood, history’s subject could not be simply empirical 
because the various subjects of study are as unique and gradated as any two humans 
might be.  He maintained that historical actions ought to be studied through the 
motives of human minds rather than natural cause-and-effect, making history a 
history of humankind, not a natural history.  He did not argue that the historian’s 
methodology should not be empirical, but simply that it called for a more flexible and 
narrative-based method than those used by researchers in the natural sciences.  For 
Collingwood, all history ought to be “unduly confined the scope of the subject” 
(Tosh, 1999, p. 115).  Collingwood and Rescher’s theories are both consistent with a 
critical constructivist notion of epistemology.  Joe Kincheloe (2005) argued that there 
is a particular critical lens that must be applied to epistemological assumptions.  This 
lens includes the consideration of the “knower, and the known,” (2003, pg. 229), the 
acknowledgement of politics and power in the consensus over, and construction of, 
knowledge; the context of knowledge and truth; one’s place in the web of knowledge 
and truth; and the idea of multiple realities, in other words, the understanding that not 
everyone constructs the same “Truth,” and that, in particular, the truth of those who 
have been oppressed by existing societal truths must especially be heard in the 
construction of new truths and new knowledge.  Pluralism is more easily able to deal 
with the idiosyncrasies of historical work because it allows for plural methods and 
plural doctrines to be mediated. 
104 
 
Collingwood (1956) describes the concept of Scissors and Paste history (pg. 
276), which he claims is the sort of pseudo-history done when a historian looks 
simply at the perceived truth-value of the claims that he or she makes, and writes 
simply the “facts” (Donagan, 1962).  Genuine history, Collingwood argues, only 
occurs when the historian gives up his or her own epistemic beliefs to assume the 
epistemic beliefs of those she is studying, and, in the process, uncovers the meaning 
behind the actions or occurrences of the past (Collins, 1976).    
In making moral statements, discussing content that is inherently ethical, or in 
deciding what is important for inclusion in curriculum, epistemology weighs heavily 
on the historian’s task. The pluralist's approach to history can best make use of 
historical writing because the approach is practical, with an emphasis on history not 
as a retelling of wars and conquering, but as an idiosyncratic, in-flux, perhaps 
informative body of knowledge.  In addition, this model allows for ethical 
consideration, and pushes history students to consider the ethical relevance of 
historical statements, rather than viewing it simply as a process of “cutting and 
pasting” evidence and reports, with an emphasis on politics and warfare.   
In making moral statements in historical writing or in using such historical 
writing to teach history, it is crucial for historians to point out the epistemological 
relevance of these statements.  This is where it becomes clear that critical-pluralism is 
effective for classroom use.  It is particularly important that those who have 
traditionally had less access to knowledge, or, as Kincheloe (2008) argues, those who 
have been marginalized by existing societal truths, have much voice in constructing 
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new truths which will, in turn, allow them access to, rather than hinder their quest for, 
knowledge.  This is particularly clear when the subject at hand is historical 
knowledge.  Plural views of historical knowledge, rather than consensus over 
historical knowledge, actually force a critical evaluation of the source and context of 
that knowledge.  But questions still remain for pluralism:  what sort of methodology 
does this leave the historian with?  What is a practical way to handle differences of 
opinion in historical writing? 
Practical Considerations of Pluralism 
 Pluralism is an appealing theoretical standpoint because it addresses the 
problem of disagreement in history as well as the moral nature of historical writing.  
Identifying the kinds of moral statements that are used in historical writing, analyzing 
these statements, and observing the trends in the way that moral statements are used 
makes it clear that methods of teaching that do not recognize these differences, 
trends, and statements are inadequate for cultivating the kind of critical engagement 
that is necessary for good historiographical thinking and historical inquiry.  The 
moral and epistemological debates over history present a puzzle for educators, 
however.  Acknowledging that moral statements do influence the way that historical 
narratives are presented, it is important to make sense of how these statements and the 
differences between portrayals ought to be handled.  Pluralism offers a way to avoid 
postmodern conceptions of history which do not build in methods for being critical of 
differences between narratives (Prozorov, 2009).    What does pluralism offer in the 
way of practical methods for the history classroom?   
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 The first practical benefit of pluralism as a method of history education is that 
it engages students in discussions of historical writing that are similar in nature to the 
work of professional historians.  Pluralism calls for the consideration of multiple 
perspectives, analysis of dissenting views, and evaluation of various sources of 
evidence.  This process is consistent with the work and methods of professional 
historians and thus avoids becoming the kind of “scissors and paste” history that 
Collingwood criticizes as being unconcerned with the role of history as a universal 
human interest (Collingwood, 1940).  A student who is taught about the Japanese-
American internment in a classroom where students are encouraged to critically 
engage with the historical writing that they are presented with would go beyond 
learning the important and undisputed facts about the internment and would develop 
the skills to compare multiple portrayals and analyze their content, evaluate claims of 
justice and injustice and to consider the broader significance of the internment to 
history and to civilization.  
 Levisohn (2009) outlines what he calls an epistemology of history for history 
education.   
 [H]istorical inquiry is appropriately characterized as a negotiation among 
 narratives that historical narratives, rather than emerging from the inventive 
 mind of the historian, are generated by a process of negotiation; and that this 
 conceptualization enables us to escape from a picture of historical narratives 
 being imposed by the historian on an unnarrativised past. Instructors of 
 history, like historians, are always in the position of constructing a narrative 
 out of narratives for themselves, and, in their scholarship or their pedagogy, of 
 intervening in the negotiation among narratives of others (Levisohn, 2009, p. 
 18). 
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 Levisohn maintains that negotiation as a necessary function of historical 
inquiry gets around unappealing solutions to the problem of diverse accounts in 
historical writing which is to “quote a bit of Foucault or Lyotard, attempting to capture a 
flavour of the postmodern intellectual zeitgeist” (Levisohn, 2009, p. 9).  
 
 Negotiation is a central feature to a pluralist method for history education.  
Negotiation should be encouraged as something students ought to do when they read 
two divergent accounts of a historical event, but it should also be viewed as a tool for 
classroom teaching.  History courses that are discussion-based are key to fully putting 
the differences and moral statements used in historical writing to work for the most 
complete and critical understanding of the past.   
 Iris Murdoch (1992) argues that that developing a sense of moral imagination 
is critical to any discipline that views morality as central to it and in which competing 
narratives are inevitable.   Johnson (1993) defines moral imagination as the process of 
“imaginatively discerning various possibilities for acting in a given situation and 
envisioning the potential help and harm that are likely to result from a given action” 
(74).   
 This kind of moral imagination can be fostered through history education that 
relies on negotiation as a means of guiding group discussion and inquiry.   Engaging 
with historians as well as peers about historiographical questions will lead to the kind 
of critical engagement that straightforward lecturing cannot emphasize.  
 One objection to the proposal that pluralism be the theoretical lens employed 
in history education in light of the theory of moral statements that I presented in 
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chapter four is that it is an unnecessary proposal or that it is already standard for 
history educators to engage in this kind of historiographical stance.  Nicholls (2006) 
points out, however, that this is not true.  He claims that for the most part students are 
not expected to engage with historiographical reasoning or justifications and instead 
are being taught in a very traditional and formal way.  The identification and analysis 
of moral statements should go far toward constructing a pluralist framework for 
critical engagement with historical writing. 
Conclusion 
 If the coverage of the interaction between Japan and the United States is any 
indication, historical writing is a complex, in-flux, multi-perspective and morally-
charged narrative of our past.  The relationship between ethics and history is an 
intricate one.  It is unclear what would be considered evidence of moral progress, 
whether the past should influence our present actions, and how we can best appraise 
historical events and actions.   
 Still, the fact that there is a connection between ethics and history seems 
undeniable.  But how best to study this connection?  Collingwood once wrote, “it is 
always with a sense of relief that, after arguing the hind leg off a donkey, one goes 
out in to the field to look at the animal for oneself” (Collingwood, 1965, pg. 96).  The 
most obvious first step toward understanding the complexities of the relationship 
between ethics and historical knowledge is to look at historical writing and the way 
that it is used.   
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 History texts have little significance apart from the way that they are engaged 
with and used by students.  Understanding the way that moral statements are used in 
historical writing is the best approach to beginning to make sense of the relationship 
between ethics and history because it can serve as a stimulus and guide for historical 
inquiry. The work outlined in this dissertation would make an important contribution 
to the work of professional historians, teacher-educators, and the professional 
development of history teachers who want to address the ethical elements of writing 
and teaching history.  The categories of moral statements that I outlined in this 
dissertation offer historians, history educators, and students with a starting point from 
which to begin to understand the presence and function of moral statements in 
historical writing. 
 The Tōhoku tsunami is fresh in our memory and the comments made about 
the tsunami being a karmic effect of the attack on Pearl Harbor on social networking 
sites strike most as insensitive, misguided, and even offensive.  These comments, 
however, could just as easily be have been made in a U.S. History course.  If they had 
been, how might an educator have made sense of this historical reference?  Pluralism 
might not answer this question directly, but it does offer a means of addressing this 
perspective as one among many.  Rather than dismissing the comment as simply 
offensive or wrong, pluralism compels educators to engage students in a discussion 
over comments of this sort in the way professional historians might engage with 
controversial positions such as Holocaust Denial.   
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 The ability to identify moral statements in history serves as an impetus for this 
kind of engagement.  The debates over the content of U.S. history courses illustrate a 
way in which this theory of moral statements would be useful.  Recognizing the shifts 
in moral sentiment, politics, and so on, and understanding the way that moral 
statements function in historical writing would allow for critical discussion about the 
goals for and purpose of history education.  This understanding would also allow for 
the curriculum debates, which tend to be abstract and unfocused on engagement, to 
forge an association of historical writing with the students who will be engaging with 
the writing.   
 So is the Tōhoku tsunami payback for Pearl Harbor?  Was the U.S. justified in 
using nuclear force against Japan?  Would the Japanese have surrendered if the 
atomic bombs were never used?  Is internment moral?  Was the relocation of 
Japanese-Americans from the west coast of the United States ultimately justified?  
Navigating the junction of ethics and history, these questions- along with so many 
more- are questions for the history classroom. 
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